Private Policing & Order Maintenance

James F. Pastor, PhD, JD
Associate Professor of Public Safety- Calumet College of St. Joseph; President- SecureLaw, Ltd.

This paper is designed to address a complex yet important topic: private policing. There are many aspects of this topic. We will focus on the key function of private policing: order maintenance. This function is not new. Indeed, it is as old as policing itself—even older. What makes this function distinctive can be answered in a few descriptive words: who, what, where, why, and how. Each of these factors is explained in detail below:

Who— entails the notion of a division of labor, where different types or levels of workers perform different tasks.
What—entails the kinds of work that will be performed.
Where—entails the locations of the work product.
Why— entails the reason a division of labor needs to be applied, and the reason why certain types of workers should or will perform these tasks.
How—entails the methods and the focus of order maintenance provisions.

Consequently, while order maintenance is as old as law and order, there are rather new or—more accurately—innovative aspects of order maintenance that will be applicable in the future. Underlying this approach, one must remember the goal of the terrorist or the extremist is to create chaos. The goal of civilized society is to maintain order through the rule of law. The dynamics on how these conflicting “goals” are achieved is the essence of order maintenance. That is: the desire to protect the homeland. Security firms will perform numerous order maintenance provisions. This will entail innovative approaches. In order to better understand how this will come about, let’s consider the notion of order maintenance.

    Theoretical and Historical Perspectives

Order maintenance is designed to control the environment in a way that makes the commission of crime—or terrorism—more difficult to accomplish. Order maintenance techniques and their relationship to the physical environment are relevant for several reasons. First, from the perspective of “normal crime,” order maintenance—widely utilized in Community Policing—may prove beneficial in both reducing crime and in reducing the level of incivility or disorder.1 With this thinking, many researchers believe that an area often undergoes a transition from relatively few crimes to one with a high incidence of crime or a heightened fear of crime, caused, in part, by lack of order.2

The theory underlying order maintenance contends that crime problems initially occur in relatively harmless activities. Drinking on the street, graffiti on buildings, and youths loitering on street corners are common activities in certain areas. If these activities go unchecked, however, the level of fear and incivility begins to rise. Left to fester, more serious crimes such as gang fights or even drive-by shootings may take place. In this sense, the presence of disorder tends to reduce the social controls previously present in the area. This results, at least in theory, in increased crime. Increased crime, particularly serious crime, in turn contributes to the further deterioration of the physical environment and of the economic well-being of the community.3

Order maintenance theories can be traced to a line of thinking that initially focused on crime ridden areas within cities. In these areas, conditions such as “physical deterioration, high density, economic insecurity, poor housing, family disintegration, transience, conflicting social norms, and an absence of constructive positive agencies” were deemed as contributors to criminal behavior.4 Overtime, researchers started to shift their focus away from socioeconomic factors. Instead the focus was directed toward the physical characteristics of the community or, in other words, the “environment.” Focusing on the physical characteristics of the location where crime occurred resulted in a substantial body of research. For example, Cohen and Felson argued that the completion of a crime requires the convergence in time and space of an offender, a suitable target, and the “absence of guardians capable of preventing the violation.”5

This focus on environmental factors was found in a number of other studies. In keeping with this theme, Gibbs and Erickson argued that the daily population flow in large cities “reduces the effectiveness of surveillance activities by increasing the number of strangers that are routinely present in the city, thereby decreasing the extent to which their activities would be regarded with suspicion.”6 Their conclusion is obvious: the more people in a given geographic area, the less likely strangers would be noticed. From this thinking, natural surveillance from community residents is reduced, leading to more crime. Lewis and Maxfield took this logic to the next level. These authors focused on specific physical conditions within the environment, seeking to assess their impact on crime. Their research assessed such things as abandoned buildings, teen loitering, vandalism, and drug use. They believe these factors draw little attention from police partially because the police have limited resources to effectively deal with these problems.7 They are important indicators of criminality within any community.

This conclusion has been echoed by a number of other authors. For example, Kelling maintained that citizens regularly report their biggest safety concerns to be things like “panhandling, obstreperous youths taking over parks and street corners, public drinking, prostitution, and other disorderly behavior.” These factors were identified as precursors to more serious crime. Moreover, the failure to remedy disorderly behaviors may be perceived as a sign of indifference. This indifference communicates that “no one cares”—which may, in turn, lead to more serious crime and urban decay. Consequently, the key to crime control is to address both the physical and social conditions that foster crime. By controlling or correcting these conditions, they will not fester into more serious levels of crime and decay.8

The implications of these studies were clear. When faced with disorderly conditions, individuals tend to feel a greater exposure to risk, and have loss of control over their immediate environment. This results in being more aware of the likelihood of a criminal attack.9 This thinking advanced the concept of “situational crime prevention.” This assessment takes into account the “intersection” of potential offenders with the opportunity to commit crime. In this sense, researchers argued the commission of a particular crime could be avoided through certain preventive measures designed to reduce the offender’s ability (or even propensity) to commit crimes at specific locations.10

These conclusions have been embraced by both public police and private security. A key component of these preventive methods, in both the public and private sectors, is known as order maintenance. Order maintenance is designed to improve conditions within a specific geographic area. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, including the rehabilitation of physical structures, the removal or demolition of seriously decayed buildings, and the improvement of land or existing buildings by cleaning and painting. Other relatively simple environmental improvements are recommended, such as planting flowers, trees, or shrubs. These are designed to enhance the “look and feel” of an area. These physical improvements, coupled with efforts to reduce or eliminate certain anti-social behaviors, such as loitering, drinking and drug usage, fighting, and other disorderly behaviors, are critical components of an order maintenance approach to crime prevention. Of course, the goal is to correct these conditions and behaviors before more serious crimes occur. Viewed in this broad manner, “security” can encompass diverse factors, from trash collection to planting flowers to private police patrols. Each is designed to improve conditions within the area. With the logic derived from this line of thinking, the need to control physical conditions and public activities is paramount.

The threat of terrorism will magnify this environmental focus. For example, an unattended package left on a street corner may actually be a lethal bomb. An unidentified vehicle may become a tragic and lethal explosion. With these demonstrated tactics of terrorists, the importance of an orderly and clean environment cannot be overstated. While these perceived or potential threats are difficult to remedy, this focus on the environment has been echoed by Kaplan, who views the environment as the security issue of the early twenty-first century.11

Discouraging crime by manipulating the environment has many facets. In the security industry, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) has been used successfully for years. This approach seeks to change certain features of the environment to reduce the incidence of crime. With this approach, natural surveillance is emphasized. In this thinking, the environmental design is structured so that users can see farther and wider. In addition, CPTED encourages territorial behaviors and natural access controls. As with the larger notion of order maintenance, proper care and control of the facilities are critical.12

In the private sector, the focus on prevention, as opposed to enforcement, has traditionally dominated the decisions of security industry officials. The similarity of private security and Community Policing techniques can be narrowed to one core goal: both are intended to utilize proactive crime prevention that is accountable to the client or the citizen, respectively. The “client focused” emphasis on preventing crime traditionally used by the security industry—not merely making arrests after a crime has occurred—directly relates to this approach. Private security is particularly well suited to perform order maintenance functions. At least partly because of its crime prevention focus, private security personnel have long since replaced public police in the protection of business facilities, assets, employees, and customers.

In light of the criminological theories outlined above, a substantial body of law recognizes the environmental aspects of crime. At least partially due to such thinking, tort causes of action, known as either premises liability or negligent security, have provided explosive business for personal injury attorneys. This legal exposure helped create a significant consequence. Property and business owners were motivated to institute security measures within and around their property or business. This can be viewed as both a carrot and a stick. The carrot is a safe and secure place to do business, and to live or work in. Of course, a safe and secure environment will not hurt the reputation of the business, or the viability of the property. Conversely, the stick is substantial potential liability, with significant jury awards. In addition, media exposure stemming from crime, coupled with the reputation and public relation damages associated with the incident, each provide particular motivation to secure the premises from criminals. Consequently, security began to be seen as an asset and crime control as a duty. Both of these often supersede merely relying on public police for protection.13

The result of this carrot and stick approach was a growing use of security personnel and methodologies. Business and property owners started to think and worry about security, becoming more proactive in their approach to a safe and secure environment. For security firms, it created business opportunities. It brought security closer and closer into the realm of the average citizen. Security personnel began to be routinely used at businesses and large corporations, now often focusing on the protection of employees and clients, instead of simply focusing on asset protection. In this sense, security became more commonplace and mainstream. Consequently, the security industry moved into the lives of average people. No longer was it just the public police who serviced the people. This relationship of the security industry to mainstream society also increased the scope of the services provided by private police.

As liability for security increased, the perimeters of security expanded farther and farther from the “protected facility.” Indeed, it is now becoming common for security patrols for properties and businesses to extend into the streets and other public areas. These extended perimeters seek to prevent crime by providing a secure environment. In this sense, private police can be deemed as another security layer, or as an extension of the security perimeter into the public domain. Conversely, public police are faced with an increasingly difficult task incorporating crime prevention or homeland security services. This is based on the broader societal mission to universally enforce laws throughout society, as well as the need to preserve democratic and constitutional ideals. Considering that the already overburdened public police are also faced with economic and operational constraints, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the role of private security will continue to increase. For these reasons, many have advocated that private police play a larger role in the prevention of crime in areas traditionally patrolled by public police. The use of order maintenance techniques will prove to be an increasingly important function of private policing, particularly in a terroristic climate.14

As security professionals appreciate and understand, the provision of security and public safety services is not the exclusive domain of government. Indeed, as the below statistics will illustrate, the majority of those individuals charged with security and public safety services are employed by private firms. Of course, this does not minimize the substantial role that public police officers contribute to public safety. The key point is that security and public safety are not exclusive to government, as security professionals throughout the world can attest to.

While this fact is commonly accepted within the security profession, the introduction of private police into the public domain may cause concern, or even alarm, to some people. This is understandable, particularly in Western countries. Most contemporary observers view police agencies as “normal,” as if this were the natural state of law enforcement. It is not. When the first police department was organized by Sir Robert Peel in London in 1829, many people viewed this with concern, or even alarm. This was due to a dramatic change in “policing.” In this way, the introduction of private policing can be viewed as back to the future, whereby private citizens will contribute more time and effort to the safety and security of their communities.

For centuries, people in the community acted as “security” within the community. The “job” of security was not even a job. There were no “police” to call. Instead, it was the duty of all able-bodied men to protect their homes and their community. Thus, the people acted in self-defense or in defense of their community. Viewed in this manner, security has historically been the provision of the people. This assertion was even reflected in one of Peel’s guiding principles: the people are the police, the police are the people.15

This brief historical perspective explains that the advent of private policing in public environments is not new. It is a variation of an age-old principle: security is the province of the people. In contemporary times, “the people” typically pay others for protection. Citizens pay taxes for municipal policing. Clients pay fees for contracted services from security firms. Both of these methods are accepted as contemporary norms. However, there is a new dynamic developing. When citizens hire security firms for protection within the public realm, a sort of back to the future circumstance occurs.

Contemporary Circumstances

This subject is both comprehensive and complex. This paper attempts to balance the complexity of these issues in a manner that is both comprehensive yet concise. This is not an easy task. The goal is to delve into each issue in a manner that leaves the reader with a sense of how order maintenance provisions will be delivered in the future. In doing so, consider this work as both a primer and a resource to those professionals interested in this emergent and important topic. Prior to delving into the substantive analysis of this subject, it is important to establish a few caveats:

First, using alternative service providers, such as private police, in no way advocates the elimination, or even the diminishment, of public policing. Indeed, one consistent theme of this paper illustrates that the expansion of security personnel into the public realm is due to forces outside the control of policing agencies. As such, the growth of private police is not a reflection of poor public policing.

Second, the use of private police is designed to supplement already overworked, and often understaffed, law enforcement officers. In this way, the work product of public and private police should be viewed in a “division of labor” perspective.

Third, as will be more fully articulated later, the provision of private policing has certain market-based benefits when compared to government-based service providers. The widespread introduction of private police serves the interests of more highly trained law enforcement officers, as well as the community—or the clients—served by these public safety service providers.

Much of the aforementioned order maintenance provisions will be performed by private police. The underlying reasoning for such rests with the logic of order maintenance. As previously developed, there are a number of functions that are currently being performed by private police. Notwithstanding the cooperative efforts and favorable data, many people—including police officers—are not totally convinced of the merits of private policing. The notion of private policing can be summarized by the following questions: Is it appropriate for “clients,” who are citizens of a governmental entity, to pay a private firm for public safety services?

Indeed, the answer is made plain with this rhetorical question: Is it wrong to pay for personal protection? Stated another way, if public police cannot or will not provide for your personal protection, is it wrong to pay a security firm to do so? No reasonable person should deny this right of self-defense. This perception, however, is not universal. Indeed, the question of self-defense also intersects with significant questions such as government sovereignty and legal authority. These questions, however, are often superseded by concerns for security and safety. In times when security and safety concerns prevail, these “esoteric” issues like the government and the law are often subordinated by the basic human desire to live. People will simply care about their own security. One can reasonably speculate that the desire for security will be much more pronounced in the years ahead. Given this reality or this perception, the question that naturally follows is, how should private policing arrangements be structured?

Let’s first answer this question initially in a broad manner. Private security and municipal policing will require a bridge that joins these seemingly complimentary, but often conflicted, entities. This requires more than “partnerships” between security and policing. It requires a structural approach, in which security personnel and municipal police are joined together within the organizational chart—and the organizational cultures of the respective entities. Policy makers should look to successful public-private models for insight and direction. These arrangements are the result of decades of effort designed to foster better relations between law enforcement and the security industry. Many of these relationships have been built on individuals moving from one profession (usually from law enforcement) and obtaining employment in the other profession (usually to the security industry). Over time, many meaningful professional relationships developed as individuals interacted with their counterparts in the other industry. Innovations like Operation Cooperation have been instrumental in this development.

Operation Cooperation is, in essence, a goal and a program. From the perception of its goals, the goal is to articulate and communicate certain partnership models, where security and police work together to combat crime and to deliver public safety services. From a programmatic perspective, ASIS International and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) published a document, titled “Operation Cooperation,” which outlines the history of public–private partnerships and advocates for future cooperative work. This document describes some of the most effective public/private policing arrangements. These include the Business/Law Enforcement Alliance (BLEA) in California, the Area Police-Private Security Liaison (APPL) program in New York City, and the Downtown Detroit Security Executive Council (DDSEC) in Detroit, Michigan. These models act as templates from which additional partnerships can be instituted.

As effective as these partnerships have been, their value will be limited unless more concrete ties are developed between private security and public police. It is becoming increasingly necessary to build upon these partnerships. Some believe that the time has come to institutionalize the efforts of security and police personnel to enhance the coordination and cooperation of public safety services. This should be done through structural and contractual relationships. Indeed, without more definitive structural or contractual ties, partnerships will be too dependent upon informal personal relationships. Personal relationships can be fickle. While these are important, they are not sufficient without more concrete ties. Unfortunately, innovative partnerships have not completely broken down the barriers between the two groups of professionals. Attitudes and histories often die hard. Despite some ongoing differences and societal trends, the insidious motivations of terrorists necessitate the acceleration of the structural cooperation of security and policing. The details of this future relationship need to be articulated and fleshed out. One thing is certain, however—enhanced structural coordination would not be possible without the tireless efforts of those professionals who developed and built foundational partnerships.

While such structural coordination is evolving, the threat of terrorism is changing the “job” of public safety providers. The military is re-orienting itself around a smaller, faster, and lighter force, emphasizing special forces and tactical methods (see figure 1). Police agencies are—or will—also re-orient around counter-terrorist and tactical methods with the use of heavier weaponry. Security personnel are also changing. They are—or will—take on a larger, wider scope into what has traditionally been viewed as public environments. Their work in public environments will entail being a “supplement” to perform work previously done by policing agencies. The work product of security personnel—deemed private police—will be centered on order maintenance and service provisions that police agencies cannot—or will not—perform.  

Figure 1: Impact of Terrorism

 

A useful way to conceptualize this arrangement is to view it in light of other professions. Three or so decades ago, the introduction of “paralegals” and “paramedics” created a great deal of controversy in their respective professions. Many in these professions viewed the introduction of “paramedics” and “paralegals” as an offensive and even dangerous intrusion into the standards maintained within the industry. The legal bar worried about lowering the “value” of the licensed attorney. Similarly, doctors worried about the quality of medical services that their clients would receive from medical paraprofessionals. Nonetheless, market and fiscal constraints necessitated the development of supplemental service providers to act as paraprofessionals for the higher-skilled licensed professionals. In this way, paramedics and paralegals contribute to client service delivery, while simultaneously supporting the professionals in a structured “work sharing” or division of labor relationship. In contemporary times, these paraprofessionals play important roles in these professions. This working relationship is manifested in different functional and cognitive roles. In this sense, alternative service providers can be analogized as “para-police.”16 A useful way to characterize these paraprofessionals was developed by McLeod. He stated: 17

para-professionals generally support the host profession by offering a restricted menu of services by technicians who may be trained for shorter periods of time, but are thus more financially affordable to the public.… Every mature profession invites the rise of para-professionals.

In short, municipal police and private security will become increasingly interrelated in the public safety industry (see Figure 2). In order for this to occur, however, private police must exhibit increased professionalism at the patrol level, which can only be accomplished by a requisite increase in training, wages, and accountability. Consequently, if “para-police” are to function within the public realm, they must be prepared to appropriately contribute to the order maintenance needs of the community. This requires taking on a supportive “paraprofessional” role of municipal police departments. Due to the extended scope of private police within public and semi-public property, the need for professionalism has dramatically increased.

Figure 2: Police and Security Converge

The “Who” of Order Maintenance

With the threat of terrorism and extremism, the delivery of order maintenance services to a given community or within a given environment will change. The days of police officers answering barking dog and noise complaints, guarding crime scenes, directing traffic, responding to alarms, and similar order maintenance services are ending. Simply stated, municipal police departments will not be able to afford employing highly trained and relatively highly paid police officers to perform such routine functions. Alternative service initiatives will be increasingly viable options for such routine functions.

Order maintenance provisions will be done by different types of workers. Some will be done by police. Most of this work, however, will be accomplished by others. A descriptive view of how this may look is shown in Figure 3. This diagram splits the provision of order maintenance into three specific areas: police officers, alternative service providers, and volunteers/service workers. As stated above, police officers will continue to perform order maintenance tasks. However, the amount or the percentage of this work will likely decrease—possibly significantly. This depends on a number of factors, such as the level of terrorism and the resultant fear, operational considerations, and financial constraints. These factors will be discussed below. Suffice it to say at this point, order maintenance provisions will be performed by many workers and by volunteers. Many volunteers (such as truck drivers) are being trained to be aware of indicators of terrorism, how to help prevent an attack, and how to respond in the event of an attack. Other programs include the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), which educates people about disaster preparedness, and Citizen Corps which embraces the individual citizen’s responsibility to be prepared for disaster relief and community safety.18

Figure 3: Order Maintenance Provisions

In addition, many service workers, such as firefighters and transit employees, are being trained in terrorism awareness programs. For example, the DHS is working with the Fire Department of New York City to establish a threat-information-sharing system between first responders and security officials. DHS officials also want to train firefighters to look for and identify signs of terrorist activity. If the program is successfully implemented in New York, it could be expanded to include fire departments across the country.19 In this program, fire department and emergency medical workers will report suspicious behavior occurring in homes of private residents. These personnel are trained to report persons who are hostile or uncooperative; persons who express open hatred toward the government; ammunition, firearms, and other weapons; blueprints and surveillance equipment; and homes with little or no furniture besides a bed.20 Each of these may be indicators of potential terrorist activity. New York City transit workers are also being trained in anti-terror seminars sponsored by the DHS. These training sessions are designed to acquaint the workers with terrorist planning, selection, surveillance, and attacks. Eventually all 28,000 transit workers will be trained.21

While these programs have merit, they are not sufficient to deal with the threat of terrorism. It will take more focused work—from people dedicated to order maintenance. The key to this approach is alternative service providers. Alternative service providers perform certain service functions—ranging from parking enforcement to crime scene security to alarm response. These services are cost-effective. They also reduce the service provisions required of police officers. While some of these tasks have long ago shifted away from police officers, there are growing indications that alternative service providers will substantially increase. Indeed, many predict that innovative initiatives utilizing private police personnel to perform basic police services, including order maintenance functions, will be widespread. These arrangements will be attractive for many reasons.

As the threat—or the reality—of terrorism grows, so will the need for security. Using the past several years as an indicator, it is reasonable to presume that the impact of terrorism will continue to strain governmental budgets. This will result in continued innovation. Technology and tactical techniques will only go so far. Cameras on street corners may help deter criminals, but will they deter the committed terrorist? Tactical and heavily armed police officers may help prevent terrorist attacks, but they cannot be everywhere. What is needed are more “eyes and ears” on the public way. Those “eyes and ears” will increasingly be attached to alternative service providers. These individuals will perform order maintenance functions—on the public way—that public police officers are unable or unwilling to perform. These functions include controlling loitering, public drinking, and rowdy behavior; providing “street corner security” in business or mixed commercial/residential districts; and responding to burglar alarm calls. These and other such tasks are critical for a secure, orderly environment.

Most reasonable people will agree that the police are responsible for managing crime and its effects. However, if the police cannot prevent crime, then one logical response is to hire individuals, either through contracts or as employees, to help control the environment. In this way, alternative service providers can be viewed as an additional layer of security. The work of these alternative service providers can be viewed from a division of labor perspective.22 Division of labor should include structural components that would enable the entities to blend the delivery of public safety services through operational and administrative processes. Consider Bayley and Shearing’s view of this model of policing. They view public police as increasingly specializing in “investigations and counterforce operations, while private police [are] becoming decentralized, full service providers of visible crime prevention.”23 This could be accomplished by focusing sworn police officers on tactical functions and shifting order maintenance functions to alternative service providers.

Two options for alternative service providers exist: either they are employed by government or they are employed by private firms. For example, Chicago has recently greatly increased its Traffic Management Authority, shifting much of the traffic control work from sworn officers to civilian employees. There is much cost savings related to this. Consider the pay rates: civilians are paid $15.59 per hour, while police were paid $31.90 per hour. City spokesperson Monique Bond explained it well. She stated, “It’ll allow us to transition out of using sworn officers … we’re reducing costs, identifying streams of revenue and deploying our police resources in a smarter way that focuses on neighborhood beat assignments and high crime areas.” Of course, not everyone agrees. Police union president Mark Donahue countered by articulating a key concern stating,24 they [the city] feel they can replace the presence of law enforcement with part time kids. In a post 9/11 society, people would like a greater police presence” (emphasis added).

As these quotes illustrate, each type of supplemental service has its own strengths and weaknesses. There are legitimate arguments on both sides of this issue. Regardless of the merits of these arguments, the fact is policing agencies will be forced to use various types of alternative service providers. Drawing your attention back to the figure, those civilians employed by government are referred to as Community Service Officers (CSO). These are civilian employees. These also include “auxiliary/reserve” officers who are typically sworn police officers working part-time, usually without benefits.25 Each reduces costs in that they entail less expense than full-time police. While each will be used, private police have particular appeal because property or business owners can directly contract with them. In this way, these public safety service provisions are outside of municipal budgets. In short, they cost government little or nothing.

Consequently, while each type of “alternative service provider” will coexist, for various reasons private firms will be the preference. One clear benefit of private firms is to provide cost savings for stretched municipal budgets. This is achieved through lower salaries, little or no pension and medical costs, overhead savings, more discretion for job actions (due to lack of unions or contract provisions), and other similar factors. Indeed, some private police arrangements are exclusively funded by voluntary real estate tax increases by business and property owners. These have clear benefits to already overburdened municipalities (see Table 1 for explanations of these options).

Table 1: Attributes of Civilianization versus Privatization

 

One critical factor derived from this table is that alternative service providers are related to a larger distinction: civilianization or privatization. This distinction is illustrated by competing theories—one based on government and one based on the market. From a market or economic perspective, advocates argue that the use of private firms will result in lower costs for the same—or better—service as compared to those derived from government.26 These authors maintain that private firms are able to pay lower wages and are more able to terminate inefficient workers. In this way, private firms are able to deliver better quality service at a lower cost. While this may not be universally true, there is substantial evidence that labor costs (including benefits, training, etc.) have a direct relationship to service quality.27 The logic is, if labor costs are high then service quality would be high (or better). Consequently, there is ample evidence that private firms can deliver more efficient services for less cost. Cost savings are typically based on: 28

1. More flexible use of labor
2. A richer array of incentives and penalties
3. More precise allocation of accountability
4. Less constraint on process, more focus on results

In addition, proponents argue that market competition results in more efficient service delivery, especially when many similarly situated firms are ready, willing, and able to provide such services. Conversely, the absence of competition within the public sector allows for complacency, with little incentive to provide better service at the lowest cost possible. Consequently, while privatized services do not guarantee that market forces will lower costs and increase service quality, these economic principles support this notion.

Similarly, some maintain that the private police perform tasks in a cost effective manner and are more flexible.29 Cost savings include lower wages and more consistency of services. This consistency stems from security personnel spending nearly all allotted time “on post” or “on beat.” Conversely, police officers spend a much higher percentage of their allotted time making arrests, doing paperwork, testifying in court, running errands, and the like.30 An additional flexibility of contracted arrangements allows for property owners to assign guards to specific locations, without having to depart to answer service calls, as is required of the public police.

Opponents see it differently. They argue that reduced labor costs are illusory. They contend that any cost reductions are achieved through hiring less qualified and less trained personnel, providing inadequate benefits to employees, using hiring practices that focus on part-time employees, and even by using creative accounting methods. They further argue that even the cost of contract bidding and administration must be assessed, as it adds to the “bottom line” and may even invite corruption.31 Aside from these factors, other authors contend that without adequate competition, the ill effects of monopolies will result.32

These opposing viewpoints demonstrate the nature of the issues related to private policing. As these views make clear, the use of privatized service providers does not guarantee either lower costs or even better service quality. However, the benefits of a limited privatization arrangement far outweigh the negatives. This is especially true in the case of public safety services, where the failure of law enforcement to protect society is potentially measured in thousands of lives. When viewed from the perspective of terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, the concerns voiced by privatization opponents seem pale. Nonetheless, many of their criticisms are well taken. It is critical to maintain competition within private sector vendors. It is critical to maintain accountability within privatized arrangements. It is critical to develop and maintain appropriate standards for the selection, training, and hiring practices of private security firms. All that said, the need for security may override these criticisms. As will be asserted in the “why” section, fear and money will trump all other factors in a sustained terroristic environment.

Most people would recognize the “Control” (or the service orientation) of the two entities. The need to “please the client” cannot be underestimated. In essence, private security firms tend to view behavior in terms of whether it threatens the interests of the client. The ability to please the client is a critical determination of any firm. This is so because the goal drives how the security firm performs its duties. When people are fearful, they will desire aggressive and extensive security. Inherent in this desire is to prevent problems—and crime. Such a role could entail aggressive enforcement of criminal laws through proactive law enforcement, and crime prevention techniques such as order maintenance. In essence, the underlying factor is the motivation or the desire of those who hire private patrols. Are the privatized patrol officers expected to “act like the police,” thereby enforcing laws and public order? This may become a major focus of their work. Conversely, public police have less incentive to “prevent crime” since they are expected to produce arrest statistics and other quantifiable measures.33 The result is an operational incentive geared toward waiting for crimes to be committed in order to make the arrest.

Perhaps the most important issue relative to the function of private police versus public police is the Economic system. For private police, the system based on market principles operated by profit oriented firms or corporations. For public police it is government. This distinction is critical. A key factor is competition versus monopoly. Most people acknowledge that competition drives better service and value. Conversely, monopolies, such as police departments, tend to be less efficient, even complacent. If the security firm is not performing or is not providing good value, it can be fired. Of course, citizens do not have this option with the police. They cannot terminate the services of the police department. While they may petition political leaders for redress, this is not nearly as effective as a 30-day termination clause, as is common in the security industry.

Typically, labor union contracts include many provisions designed to protect workers. While this is not in itself problematic, when compared to the 30-day cancellation clause typically found in security contracts, one is struck by the fact that nonperforming firms can be “fired” much more simply than nonperforming public employees. For this reason alone, government officials may find this an attractive option. In addition, one distinct advantage of private policing is that the monies used to provide these services are obtained from business or property owners, either derived from special taxing initiatives or more directly from contracts with property or community associations. With these funding sources, private policing services could be sustained with little or no municipal expenditures. Consequently, the economic benefits derived from privatized service providers can help relieve already strained municipal budgets. Given the current economic circumstances, it seems apparent that financial constraints will necessitate more “creative” service provisions. This assertion is pointedly echoed by economist Diane Swonk. When you read this quote, please keep in mind this was written years prior to the financial collapse in 2008. In any event, she stated,34

almost half of all states were already in a budget deficit and trying
to cut back prior to 9/11, and by allocating more funds toward
security after 9/11, they would be forced to make some very difficult and counter-intuitive decisions about the fiscal situations in the months that followed.

Only time will tell how the current economic woes and public safety concerns will coalesce. However this plays out, the need for security coupled with the budgetary constraints facing government will result in privatized arrangements being viewed as attractive alternatives. At the core of these arrangements is the choice between labor union contracts versus firm service contracts.

Finally, obtaining public safety services from private firms typically entails the contracting party being a property or homeowner association. Obtaining these services from a taxing initiative usually involves the creation of a special taxing district that has its powers derived from a governmental entity, such as state or city legislation. This district acts as a political subdivision of the legislative entity that created it. Depending on the purpose of its creation, the political subdivision could be conferred broad powers—usually to promote economic development or stability—through the assertion of health, safety, and environmental improvements. The specific source of the monies can be a tax on real property or even a sales tax levy. Since the tax is confined to a certain geographic area, the local property or business owners usually maintain control over the authority vested in the district. This control enhances the accountability on the taxing levels and revenues derived from the district. Participation in this authority usually requires specific connections to the geographic area, such as being a property owner, working in or owning a business within the district, or owning stock in a corporation within the district.35

The “What” of Order Maintenance

The focus of this section is “what” kinds of work will be performed. In this function, the key will be to control the environment. As illustrated in the historical section, this requires focus on both physical and social incivilities. Going forward, this work will be increasingly accomplished by the use of technologies and by the use of alternative service providers. The primary tasks will focus on certain routine service functions, such as report writing, alarm response, traffic control, and “street corner security.” Each of these tasks relates to order maintenance or other services. In this sense, alternative service providers will also enhance the “eyes and ears” of policing agencies.

Considering the significance of this question, the author conducted extensive research on alternative service providers. This included riding in a patrol car as the private police officers performed their duties. As one of the few—if not the first—to perform such ride-along research of private policing, I had a bird’s eye view of this new policing model. The study demonstrated that private police officers will perform many service and order maintenance functions. The research also revealed that even law enforcement functions, such as arrests for gun possession and serious crimes, were performed by private security personnel—as they patrol public streets. It also demonstrated that constitutionally violating searches and seizures would occur and that questionable legal authority will complicate their patrol functions.36

Specifically, this research addressed a key element of this new policing model: the use of private police patrols on public streets. As Table 2 illustrates, order maintenance was the dominant function performed by private police (51.5%). This is consistent with the “client service” focus of private security and with a key premise of Community Policing—reducing disorderly conditions results in less crime. The remaining functions by the private police officers were observe and report (31.8%) and law enforcement (16.6%). These findings reveal that private police focus on certain “lower” level police functions, such as order maintenance and as the “eyes and ears” of the police (the “observe and report” function). In this way, private police demonstrate that they could perform these functions—thereby allowing municipal police departments the ability and resources to focus on higher level concerns or threats.

     Table 2: Functionality of Para-Police

The “Where” of Order Maintenance

When one considers the provision of public safety and security services, it is useful to think in terms of location and provision (Table 3). In this table, the location is broken down as either private or public, and the provision is divided as either a substitute or a supplement. Looking at such tasks in a conceptual manner, it is useful to think of the location of the services in relation to the service provision.

Table 3: Structural Arrangements

In the private/substitute cell, the typical provision is where the security personnel, either contract or proprietary, provide the majority (if not all) of security services. Security firms have traditionally operated almost exclusively within private environments. In this sense, security personnel act as the “sheriff” within their environment. They typically do so with little or no support from the public police. The practice in this environment is that security personnel act as a “substitute” for police agencies, providing most, if not all, of the security services at the particular location. This does not mean that public police officers do not nor cannot enter into these facilities. It simply means that public police do not routinely enter or patrol private facilities and properties. For example, public police typically do not stand guard at the entrance of a manufacturing plant. Instead, private facilities typically perform their own dedicated patrols or other crime prevention services. Of course, if a crime occurs, police are often called to the private property. In this way, the cell is not a complete substitute. It is largely a substitute, and for some firms an almost exclusive substitute. Consequently, this cell represents the norm in the security industry.

In the public/substitute cell, the towns of Remainderville, Ohio, and Sussex, New Jersey, fired their police officers and hired security personnel as substitutes. When this occurred, the security officers patrolled the town, answered calls for service, took reports, and made arrests. In this sense, the private security personnel acted as a substitute for the public police. These services were provided within the public domain, as if they were “the police.” This highly unusual and controversial substitute arrangement was terminated after a short period of time. Simply stated, there are too many problematic issues tied to this type of an arrangement. Although this arrangement proved unsustainable, it represents the extreme of privatization—being the actual “sheriff” within the town. To be clear, this author does not advocate such an extreme approach. I do, however, advocate the use of privatized patrols as supplements in both private and public environments. This is where the focus will be as we go forward.

In the private/supplement cell, there are many examples of security firms acting as a supplement to the public police. These often occur in private, gated communities. In these instances, the “protected communities” are separated by perimeter fencing coupled with private security patrols within the area. There are countless examples of contracted security services within gated communities.37 One author estimated that by the mid 1990s between three and four million people in the United States lived in gated communities. Later data reveals that this number has increased to seven million, with over 50,000 gated communities.38 A survey of gated communities in South Africa revealed some extraordinary data. Of the 117 municipalities that responded to the survey, fully 20 percent had enclosed neighborhoods and 23 percent had large security estates.39 Some authors who study gated communities, such as Blakely and Synder, contend that security is the driving force for all gated communities.40 In this sense, gated communities may represent a fortress mentality growing in America and in some Westernized countries. Much of this occurred prior to 9/11.

In this private/supplement cell, there is overlap between the service provision of public and private entities. In this cell, the focus is on supplementing or enhancing the public safety provision already provided by policing agencies. For example, on college campuses there are often undefined or loosely defined boundaries between the “campus” and the larger community. In these areas, the public police may regularly, or at least semi-regularly, patrol the gated community and the college or corporate campus. The involvement of public police in these areas is usually more than in the private/substitute areas, and substantially less than public streets, parks, and the like (i.e., in the public realm). Consequently, the provision of security services by private firms in this cell (private/supplement) is already quite extensive.

In these locations, private security firms provide patrol and other “quality of-life” services that the police are unable or unwilling to perform. Most of the functional service provision is manifested in “observe and report” and order maintenance tasks. In this sense, these arrangements combine the traditional “observe and report” function of private security with the order maintenance role traditionally reserved for public police. The same can be said of the substantial growth of shopping malls. The extent of growth coupled with the potential for terroristic attack make the notion of securing shopping malls critical. Indeed, attacks and planned attacks of shopping malls may become “common.”41 This same desire for security is also driving private policing in public environments. Performing such functions in the public domain, however, raises important public safety and public policy questions.

            Notwithstanding the potential for both benefit and abuse, these private patrols have been relatively unstudied within academic research and largely overlooked by policy makers. An increasingly common approach in private policing is acting as a supplement to public police. This illustrates the public/supplement realm. It is this aspect of privatization of police services that has the most growth potential. Many of these arrangements are contained within business improvement districts (BID). Indeed, there are over 40 of these districts in the city of New York alone. There are more than one thousand across the United States.42 In addition, the need to secure critical infrastructure is clearly part of this order maintenance function. The security of ports, utilities, transportation, water and sanitary systems, farms and food supplies, and a host of other critical aspects of a functioning society must be secured. For example, the DHS distributed $844 million in fiscal 2008 grants for protection of ports, transit systems, and other components of the nation’s critical infrastructure.

This funding is intended to support terrorism and disaster prevention, protection, and response and recovery capabilities. “With this year’s funding, the department will have provided roughly $3 billion in grants for securing the nation’s critical infrastructure and transportation systems,” Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said in a press release. “As capabilities mature, we’re encouraging state and local governments and the private sector to prioritize prevention and protection, communications capabilities, information sharing and regionally based security cooperation.”43 In these environments, the typical provision of security services is from private firms. Indeed, approximately 85% of the critical infrastructure is owned and secured by private firms.44

Accurate statistical information on the current scope of private policing is difficult to pinpoint, as there is no reference source that collects information on these arrangements. In any case, some examples will illustrate a larger approach that some may view as a trend. As a means to introduce these examples, it may be helpful to think about the roles of private police and those of public police. Remember that much of the traditional literature on policing distinguishes public police as being focused on “law enforcement,” while private police focus on “observe and report.” Partly due to the impact of Community Policing, these traditional roles appear to be changing, with both groups being concerned with order maintenance functions. In this sense, it may be difficult to distinguish the work of the public police from the work of the private police.

The scope and details of these arrangements vary widely. In rare cases, private security has replaced public police within a given jurisdictional area. In most private policing initiatives, some level of “partnership” or some supplement with local police agencies form the basis for the arrangement. These partnership arrangements have a particular logic, especially when one considers the characteristics of public and private policing. Both have many similar goals—usually designed to reduce crime and fear through an environmental or order maintenance approach.

Hopefully, the commonality of goals may serve to foster cooperative efforts in the “spirit of public safety.” One way this could occur is when public police rely on private police to carry out tasks they prefer not to undertake. In return, public police provide some needed service, such as expeditious response to calls for assistance. Most public police officials welcome a fuller partnership with private security, if contracting would free up their officers for crime fighting.45

The “Why” of Order Maintenance

The prospect for alternative service providers—particularly private policing—conducting order maintenance functions can be derived from two basic factors: fear and money. Both of these factors will independently contribute to the market need for these services. Both of these factors, in combination, will increase the need for private policing in public environments. There are a number of ways that these factors are manifested. A useful characterization may include: Economic and operational issues (money) Crime and terrorism (fear)

Economic and Operational Issues (Money)

The relative cost of salaries is a significant factor between public and private policing. Of course, labor costs and benefits have a substantial price tag. From a purely financial perspective, alternative service providers, such as private security firms, provide certain cost savings. Estimates place the median annual income of security guards at $20,320 with the highest 10 percent paid at $33,270. This is consistent with salary surveys. For example, a compensation survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics found the cost of hourly pay for security personnel ranging from an average of $6.82 in the Tampa/St. Petersburg metro area to $12.82 per hour in Denver.46 More recent data reveal that the hourly wages for security personnel vary according to function and employment. Table 4 illustrates these variables.47

Table 4: Private Security Salary Structures

Compare these data to public police. Even rather dated police expenditures reveal that it costs at least $100,000 per year per police officer when salary, benefits, and overhead expenses were calculated into the equation.48 In addition it is quite typical that personnel expenditures represent the single largest municipal budgetary line item. For example, two groups—police and fire—represent over 55 percent of the total expenditures for the city of Chicago. Personnel costs included salaries or wages, pensions, and fringe benefits. These costs, adjusted for inflation, increased 63 percent over the 10-year period.49 This is straining municipal budgets and operations. For example, the police union in Chicago filed a lawsuit against the city related to the denial of compensatory time. In his decision, U.S. District Judge Schenkier found that the Chicago Police Department operated 22 of the 25 police districts with fewer than the authorized number of police officers, with an aggregate shortfall of 8.04 percent fewer officers than authorized. In his decision—which was ironically issued on September 11, 2007, Judge Schenkier concluded that the city deprived police officers their statutory right to use compensatory time. He asserted that: 50

there is evidence that the city [Chicago] regularly assigned fewer personnel to the various units and district than authorized by the budget… We do not presume to tell the city how many police personnel it must hire, or how to balance the challenging budgetary
and public safety concerns that the city must confront.

Similar economic constraints have been reflected in academic research. For example, Savas found about 90 to 95 percent of police budgets go to personnel costs. His study of New York City revealed that over a 25-year period, the number of public police officers rose from 16,000 to 24,000. However, the total annual hours worked by the entire force actually declined. He noted that the entire increase in the city’s police force (fully 50 percent) was devoted to personnel benefits, such as shortening the workweek, lengthening lunch periods and vacation time, and providing more holidays and paid sick leave.51 This assertion is echoed by Youngs, who stated, “Police in today’s environment typically spend less than 20% of their time on crime related matters.” This circumstance is just the tip of the iceberg. These conflicts between costs and operations reveal greatly strained financial circumstances.52

Based on these statistics, a large proportion of the expenditures of policing—and of municipalities—are allocated to pay salaries and benefits of public police officers. These statistics raise the logical question: Can this pay structure be sustained? As asserted earlier, this is doubtful. While public police departments experience budget constraints, private security firms have dramatically expanded their relative size and scope. Indeed, studies of the “public safety” industry reveal a growing disparity between public and private policing. Over time, this data reveals a growing trend toward monies being spent on private security as compared to public police. By the year 2000, the ratio of dollars invested in private compared to public policing reveals that about 70 percent of all money invested in crime prevention and law enforcement is spent on private security.53 Based on the spending patterns after 9/11, more and more monies are being spent on security technologies. There is nothing to suggest that this will not continue.

Going forward, a market research firm predicts that the U.S. demand for private contracted security services will grow 4.3 percent a year to $48 billion in 2010, according to a report by analyst Jennifer Mapes of the Freedonia Group. According to the report, the security sector should benefit from the sharp focus on safety and security on the part of government, corporations, and consumers. These estimates also reveal that by 2017 a staggering $81 billion will be spent annually on a range of security services. Indeed, the federal government alone has spent $41 billion on homeland security funding in 2004, which is double the amount in fiscal year 2001.54 How long can the government continue this level of funding? Of course, this increase in security spending and investments is attributed to terrorism—and to people wanting to feel safe. According to Mapes, despite falling crime rates, consumers are worried about crime and overburdened public safety agencies. “The aftermath of 9/11 has created a continuing and accelerating backdrop for revenue in the security companies, whether they be military related or homeland security related or ultimately commercially related,” said analyst Jeffrey Kessler of Lehman Brothers.55

Beyond the salaries, benefits, and investments, a number of authors have argued certain operational functions drive up the costs associated with public safety services. For example, for decades citizens have been urged to call “911.” This computerized call-taking system has resulted in huge increases in workloads in police departments. Years of urging citizens to call “911” has contributed to a culture where people call the police for more and more service-oriented requests. Calls for such things as barking dogs, streetlight repairs, noisy neighbors, unruly children, alarm response, and the like have created a difficult “unintended consequence” for police agencies already strapped with resource constraints.56 This “unintended consequence” was aptly described by Scott and Goldstein, who stated, “Citizens [are] bringing problems to the police that the police may not be best suited to address.”57 Attempts to resolve the increasing level of service calls had some success, such as using “311” (non-emergency police response), and call stacking (prioritizing calls for dispatch based on level of seriousness).58 However, these have not resolved the basic dilemma—servicing the community through the resources allocated to the department.

Added to these operational costs is the expense associated with a proactive crime prevention strategy. This proactive approach is in keeping with the Community Policing model now in vogue within policing. A proactive crime control strategy is costly to administer and is very labor intensive. In purely financial terms, Community Policing has created additional tasks for police agencies. These tasks include beat meetings, crime prevention missions, accountability sessions, and other service- and communication-oriented tasks. Most readers would agree that proactive problem-solving tasks take to time to accomplish. As a result, these tasks have contributed to the budgetary and operational constraints now facing municipal police agencies. The ability to maintain this level of service seems unrealistic.

This circumstance illustrates a basic problem with fully implementing Community Policing. Simply stated, the resources, operational constraints, and personnel levels associated with these tasks have resulted in overburdening policing agencies. The threat of terrorism has exacerbated this situation. Ironically, this may provide an impetus for public police to transfer to or supplement forces with private security personnel. As stated earlier, crime prevention and order maintenance have been the forte of private security.

With these functions in mind, private policing will play an increasingly larger role in public safety. The form of this new policing model may mirror the Community Policing approach, which is premised on service designed to achieve crime prevention and control. In this sense, private police will be used to supplement public police in service and order maintenance functions. This allows public police officers more free time to devote to more serious crimes, including terrorism prevention and response. Carlson asserts that communities are certain to follow this approach because “they may have to.” He draws the analogy with medical care in that hospitals were “forced” to give more responsibility to nurses due to rising medical costs. Carlson emphasized his point in this way:59

Cities may find that sworn police officers whom they must train,
pay relatively well and sustain pensions—are too expensive—for
fighting and deterring certain types of low-level crimes. To
maintain basic civic order, rent-a-cops may be a better deal.

Instead of considering private police officers as “rent-a-cops,” the more appropriate way to characterize their role is as “alternative service providers.” Many needed and valuable services can be performed at a far reduced cost, as compared with public police officers. Importantly, by using these alternative service providers, it frees up police resources and personnel for more serious matters, such as gang and drug activities, tactical operations, criminal investigations, terrorism prevention, and
intelligence gathering. In turn, there are numerous service-oriented tasks that can be performed by private police. Contracting certain service tasks can be equated to “outsourcing,” which is common in business.60

The budgetary and operational dilemma for law enforcement officials may be best illustrated by alarm response. Alarm response refers to police being dispatched to burglar, fire, or panic alarms from commercial, industrial, and residential facilities. To understand the impact of this service provision, it may be helpful to cite some statistics. Nationwide, alarm calls comprise 10–12 percent of all calls for service. In the year 2000, Blackstone and Hakim estimate the annual costs for this service at $1.8 billion. This figure is equivalent to paying 35,000 police officers.61

According to the Seattle Police Department, alarm response accounts for the second largest resource allocation. In just one year (2003), Seattle police officers responded to over 22,000 alarm calls, averaging about 62 alarms a day at a total estimated cost of $1.3 million per year.62 Similarly, in 1995, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department received more than 500,000 calls for service. More than 100,000 were alarm calls. Of these alarm calls, 98.6 percent of them were “false alarms” (meaning no crime occurred). The department estimated that 70,000 “officer hours” were spent responding to these calls.63 In an astonishing statistic, the Los Angeles Police Department responded to more than 120,000 alarm calls in one calendar year—which lead to only one arrest.64 Partly due to this circumstance, the executive director of the L.A. Police Commission, Joe Gunn, asserted that “we [the city] lost 15% of the patrol time responding to false alarms.”65

Often the problem with alarm response is attributed to the high rate of false alarms, which is as high as 95 percent or more.66 This is only part of the problem. Consider that in the 1980s, only two to five percent of residences had alarm systems. This figure increased to 10 percent in the 1990s, and to about 20 percent by the year 2000.67 Consequently, as the market for security alarms increased, the burden of alarm response for police agencies has also increased.

Many police agencies are looking for ways to deal with this problem. For example, using fines against property owners for excessive false alarms is common throughout the country.68 While these have some merit, some argue that the police agencies still have to bear the operational burden of responding to false alarms, without directly receiving the revenue from the fines (which go to the overall city coffers).69 At least partly based on this reality, some cities have instituted “verified response.” This entails police not responding to alarms unless the call is verified by some third party (owner, clerk, witness, security, etc.).70 In this policy, the call must be proven to be “bonafide” (an actual crime is occurring or has occurred).

Salt Lake City instituted this policy in 2000. It reduced police responses by 90 percent, resulting in substantial cost reductions for the department.71 In addition, this policy had other benefits to the department. For example, police response time to other emergencies decreased and police availability increased.72 Importantly, it was also noted that the response times by private security to these calls were shorter than the response times by the police.73

While the reader can discern the obvious dilemmas related to alarm response and “verified response,” the fact is, given the financial and operational constraints for policing agencies, private response is inevitable. Consider Johannesburg, South Africa. Partly due to resource constraints and response-time deficiencies, there is a growing market for alarm response conducted by private firms. As with the United States, this service provision evolved from the public’s lack of confidence in the responsiveness of the police. In this sense, people looked to the private sector for more responsive protection. The result is more than 450 registered companies serving about 500,000 clients. These firms employ about 30,000 private officers who provide alarm response services. These officers are equipped with 9 mm weapons, and bulletproof vests, but have only citizen arrest powers. The average response time to the protected facility is five minutes. According to Davis, these services were done in a professional manner. He drew this conclusion by measuring citizen complaints, use of force incidents, and the average response time for alarm calls.74

These examples result in one overriding conclusion: since public police response was deemed not acceptable, citizens looked to the market for more responsive protection.75 While some services such as alarm response may be necessary, the compelling conclusion is that municipalities will not be able to afford the status quo.76 Partly as a result of this situation, the Toronto Police Department reported that more than 60 percent of all calls to the police are handled by “alternative response” units, which include private police acting as a supplement to public police departments.77

The data and analysis presented in this section illustrate that public police are overburdened with many service-oriented functions, as well as by the economic and operational costs of providing these services to the public. Private police can help resolve these functional and economic constraints. Indeed, terrorism will only exacerbate these constraints—thereby accelerating the need for alternative service providers. When terrorist attacks occur—and they will—private police will increasingly move into many public spaces, including business and residential communities. This chapter shows how private police services, financed through alternative funding sources, have been used to address economic and operational constraints that burden police departments.

Finally, the overriding implication drawn from this section is that private police will be increasingly utilized to combat or respond to crime. Numerous authors have predicted or shown that private security personnel are being hired in response to the incidence of crime.78 This assertion is echoed by Stephanie Mann, the author of Safe Homes, Safe Neighborhoods, who asserted that “[p]eople need to take responsibility for their safety. … Citizens are the law and order in a community, not the police.”79

It can be argued that the private security industry is responding to the demand from individual citizens, businesses, and even communities due to the incidence and fear of crime. These views were advocated as a result of the impact of “normal” crime. With the threat of terrorism, it seems particularly appropriate to assert that government cannot implement the necessary remedies to deal with crime and terrorism (including the attendant fears) without the contribution of the private sector.

Crime and Terrorism (Fear)

As demonstrated above, the relationship between crime and fear has been systematically developed in numerous studies.80 Similarly, other authors assert that crime has led to a generalized increase in fear levels in certain demographic subsections, as well as in the larger society.81 From both perspectives, the conclusions were similar and compelling. The consistent conclusion was that crime has created a concern, often rising to what could be construed as fear. This fear of crime is exacerbated by signs of criminal activity. Criminal activity, such as disorder or incivility, has an impact on people’s perceptions of crime. In this sense, incivility is equated with disorder, in that both purport to represent chaotic conditions that result in more serious criminal activity.

This leads to the conclusion that the combination of concern with crime and incivility (or disorder) affects neighborhood fear levels. The levels of fear are greatest where both crime and incivility coexist. Hence, objective crime rates are mediated by perceptions of neighborhood incivility. Ironically, if incivility (or disorder) is not perceived to be a problem, then residents may be able to cope with higher rates of crime. This conclusion has important implications. Communities must deal with both the crime rate and the physical and social indicators that lead to the perception of incivility and disorder.82

Now add terrorism to the equation. It is important to remember this key distinction: while crime causes fear, terrorism is designed to cause fear. Anyone who studies terrorism understands that terrorist acts are designed to play to the audience. Think of this distinction. If you are mugged on a subway, it is likely that the offender was interested in one thing: your money. He does not desire publicity. He does not want acclaim for his actions. Instead he wants to spend your money. He certainly does not want his “deed” to appear on the news. Now consider a terrorist act. Generally, the victims of the act are irrelevant. By that I mean the victims are typically a means to a larger end—unless the victim is intentionally assassinated, such as former Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto. Usually, however, the victims are simply a way of communicating the “deed.” The message is, pay attention to us because you may be next!

This dynamic speaks volumes. It will create a need for more security. It will explain “why” police methods need to be changed. It will convey a deep message that the government (read the police and law enforcement) may not be able to protect you. This will increase—potentially substantially—the movement toward engaging more alternative service providers (read security personnel and technologies).

A couple of international examples may help to illustrate this dynamic. The private security industry is booming in Mexico City, where residents are taking steps to protect themselves from an increase in violent crime. A recent study showed that 25 percent of Mexico City residents reported being the victim of a crime in 2005. The country has a higher per-capita rate of violent robbery than the United States or any country in Europe. The traditional security measures employed by civilians
include private guards, closed-circuit surveillance systems, and alarms. One expert reported that many Mexico City homes are also protected by electric fences. In order to meet the increased demand for security solutions, many companies are offering innovative new products. Consider these examples. Uno Technology has received 600 orders for a surveillance system that can send live video feeds to clients’ cell phones, allowing them to constantly keep track of their home, business, or car. FLIR Systems recently began selling thermal infrared imaging cameras to commercial clients. The technology, which can detect a potential intruder’s body heat, was traditionally used by law enforcement and the military. Xtrem Secure, a Mexican magazine covering the security industry, reported that many firms are seeing annual revenue increases of 25 percent. 83

This response has come from “normal” crime. The response to crime related to organized gangs and terrorism is even more problematic. As Mexico’s drug cartels become increasingly violent, it has led to higher demand for security services in Mexico. Up to five percent of Mexico’s gross domestic product is being spent on security, and the market for electronic security technology in Mexico is growing between 10 percent and 15 percent annually, according to the Latin American Security Association trade group. Terrorism in Mexico also became a concern after al Qaeda urged terrorists to attack oil facilities in Mexico and elsewhere. There are 400,000 security guards in Mexico, and outdoor surveillance camera networks have been implemented in 16 of Mexico’s 31 states.84

In addition, after the terrorist attacks in November 2008 in Mumbai, an increasing number of citizens are turning to private-sector security and emergency services because local authorities failed to stop the terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks caused many Mumbai residents to feel vulnerable for the first time. Rajeev Sharma, president of the security firm Topsgrup, said, “There has been an unprecedented rise in inquiries,” when asked about his services since the attacks, and he has run out of armed guards. The company employs more than 40,000 guards nationally. Private emergency services also are expecting more attention because of the attacks. Sweta Mangal, the chief executive of a Mumbai ambulance service company, said its vehicles arrived at some of the attack sites before the police did.85 When attacks like Mumbai occur in America, the result will be similar. Consequently, please consider this significant dynamic derived from the dual yet basic factors of money and fear.

The “How” of Order Maintenance

“How” entails a very different approach to order maintenance. As developed in the theoretical/historical section, the traditional desire of order maintenance was to change physical and social conditions in order to reduce crime. In this approach, often called the “broken windows” theory, the focus was on abandoned buildings, littering, graffiti, and other physical conditions within the environment.86 This approach also focused on social aspects such as drinking, loitering, prostitution, and disorderly behaviors. Both the physical and the social cues created the perception that the people in the community do not take care of the neighborhood. As such, the environment was said to be conducive to more serious crime. While these concerns will still be relevant in the public safety era of policing, they will be subordinated to an overall desire to protect. A descriptive, shorthand way of describing this approach is to focus on protection instead of service.

This requires a different purpose underlying order maintenance provisions. For example, in the Community Policing era the purpose was to clean the environment of physical and social incivilities in order to combat crime. In the public safety era the purpose will be to control the environment in order to protect the community. Due to the potential devastating impact of terrorism, this desire to control the environment will be based on the following formula: order + surveillance = control. The use of surveillance technologies will be a critical element of this new policing model. These technologies, coupled with an “enhanced” order maintenance approach—with more eyes and ears on the street—will result in an almost “clinical” focus on the environment.

The application of a “clinical” environmental approach at improving security can be illustrated by recent changes implemented in British railroad stations. These stations will soon have additional security standards with more thorough screening, including the use of biometric identification. Civilian employees will also be trained by terrorism experts on how to conduct searches and identify suspicious behavior. In addition, the number of security service personnel is projected to ultimately double what it was in 2001. “While no major failures in our protective security have been identified, companies responsible for crowded places will now be given updated and more detailed advice on how they can improve their resilience against attack, both by better physical protection and greater vigilance in identifying suspicious behavior,” said British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.87

An excellent—yet dramatic—example of this clinical focus on the environment is illustrated by a recent proposal devised by the New York Police Department. It advocates placing the new World Trade Center into a “security zone.” Only specially screened taxis, limousines, and cars would be able to enter the site through “sally ports,” or barriers guarded by police officers. Plans also include 12 guard booths erected at popular street corners where pedestrians or automobiles access the site. Service and delivery trucks will be required to pass through the underground bomb screening center, and buses will not be allowed to leave the underground security center and garage until each passenger has returned. In addition to these security measures at this site, each automobile that comes into Manhattan will also have its picture taken and its license plate scanned by the NYPD. The data will be stored for at least one month. This plan is part of the NYPD’s Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (more about this plan in the next chapter), which aims to increase security in the area by deploying armed officers, closed-circuit television cameras, license plate readers, and explosives trace
detection systems.88

Beyond this environmental focus, other order maintenance strategies have been proposed. For example, Chief Bratton is promoting the idea of “policing terrorism” in Los Angeles, much the same way he embraced the “broken windows” strategy in New York City. He advocates focusing on small crimes before they turn into big ones. The key is to shift police officers away from the idea that they are only first responders and train them on prevention techniques.89 Getting police oriented toward prevention, of course, is consistent with the tenets of Community Policing. While I agree that much of the focus of police should be on prevention—or what I think is better characterized as protection—the reality is police will need help. I believe this help will come from military weaponry, technology, and alternative service providers.

These alternative service providers will include civilian governmental employees, volunteers, and, most importantly—and controversially—private police officers. Given the data and analysis contained in this chapter, one can reasonably assert that the majority, if not the vast majority, of order maintenance functions will be conducted by private police employed by security firms. There are numerous order maintenance functions that can be accomplished by these lower skilled, less paid workers. The tasks of these alternative service providers may include, but are not limited to: 90

• Traffic accidents
• Traffic control
• Parking tickets
• Abandoned vehicles
• Vehicle lockouts
• Building checks
• Alarm response
• Animal complaints
• Funeral escorts
• Paperwork/subpoena services
• “Cold call” follow-ups
• Vandalism complaints/reporting
• Theft/burglary/lost and found reporting
• Crime scene security
• Prisoner transports/security
• Missing persons assistance
• Shoplifting arrests
• Special event security

 

I close this paper with the acknowledgment that “combining” police and security into a larger “public safety” policing model will not be easy. There are numerous pitfalls and complications to this transition. Admittedly, it may be a tall task, with many roadblocks and obstacles in the way. When you identify or encounter these obstacles, remember two words: fear and money. These will be the drivers toward this transition. I contend these two basic premises will overcome any obstacle. In addition, many have already worked long and hard to develop “partnerships” and other relationships between professionals in security and policing. These will go a long way in facilitating this new model of policing.

                                                Copyright, James F. Pastor, 2010

Endnotes

1. Pastor, James F. (2003). The Privatization of Police in America: An Analysis and Case Study. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
2. Covington, Jeanette and Ralph B. Taylor (1991). “Fear of Crime in Urban Residential Neighborhoods: Implications of Between and Within Neighborhood Sources for Current Models,” The Sociological Quarterly 32, no. 2:231–49; Lewis, Dan A. and Michael G. Maxfield (1980). “Fear in the Neighborhoods: An Investigation of the Impact of Crime,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency July:160–89; and Kelling, George (1995). “Reduce Serious Crime by Restoring Order,” The American EnterpriseMay/June.
3. Pastor, James F. (2003), op. cit.
4. McLennan, Barbara N., ed. (1970). Crime in Urban Society. London: Cambridge University Press.
5. Cohen, Lawrence E. and Marcus Felson (1979). “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends,” American Sociological Review 44:588–607.
6. Gibbs, Jack P. and Maynart L. Erickson (1976). “Crime Rates of American Cities in an Ecological Context,” American Journal of Sociology 82:605–20. Also see Reppetto, who concluded that social cohesion and informal surveillance declines when a large number of people live in a given area, in Jackson, Pamela Irving (1984). “Opportunity and Crime: A Function of City Size,” Sociology and Social Research 68, no. 2:173–93.
7. Lewis, Dan A. and Michael G. Maxfield (1980), op. cit.
8. Kelling, George (1995), op. cit.
9. These “theoretical” concepts have been widely recognized in police operations. For example, numerous physical and social factors contributing to crime reduction and problem solving are enumerated in policies and procedures by municipal police departments, such as “Community and City Services Problem Strategies” (2000), in Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS). Chicago Police Department, December 12:1–14.
10. Fisher, Bonnie and Jack L. Nasar (1995). “Fear Spots in Relation to Micro-level Physical Cues: Exploring the Overlooked,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 32, no. 2:214–39.
11. Kaplan, Robert (1994). “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly February.
12. Felson, Marcus (2002). Crime and Everyday Life. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; and Atlas, Randy  (2008). “Fear of Parking,” Security Management February: 54.
13. Pastor, James F. (2006). Security Law and Methods. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.
14. See, for example, Benson, Bruce L. (1990). The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without State. San Francisco, CA: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy; McLeod, Ross (2002). Para-Police. Toronto: Boheme Press; Chanken, Marcia and Jan Chaiken (1987), op cit.; and Palango, Paul (1998), op. cit.
15. Oliver, Willard M. (2004). Community-Oriented Policing: A Systematic Approach to Policing. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; and Pastor, James F. (2003), op. cit.
16. McLeod, Ross (2002), op. cit.
17. McLeod, Ross (2002), op. cit., 15 and 61.
18. See http://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/ (retrieved on February 1, 2009).
19. Meserve, Jeanne and Mike M. Ahlers (2007). “FDNY Anti-Terror Plans Spark Fears of Witch Hunts,” CNN (retrieved on December 5, 2007).
20. DeStefano, Anthony M. (2007). “New Role for the Bravest,” Newsday (retrieved on November 24, 2007).
21. www.nydailynews.com (retrieved on October 11, 2007).
22. This division of labor approach was characterized as “blended policing” by McLeod, Ross (2002), op. cit., 129.
23. Bayley, David H. and Clifford D. Shearing (2001). “The New Structure of Policing,” NIJ July.
24. Spielman, Fran (2004). “Daley Wants Bigger Traffic Management Corps,” Chicago Sun-Times, November 12.
25. Bourque, Julia (2004). “Chief: More Officers Mean Less Crime: Calumet City to Lure Reserve Police Officers,” Northwest Indiana Times, July 2.
26. Wessel, Robert H. (1995). “Privatization in the United States,” Business Economics, October; Donahue, John D. (1989). The Privatization Decision. New York: Basic Books; Tolchin, Martin (1985). “Private Guards Get New Role in Public Law Enforcement,” The New York Times, November 29; Clotfelter, Charles T. (1977). “Public Services, Private Substitutes and the Demand for Protection Against Crime,” The American Economic Review 67, no. 5:876; Miranda, Rowan A. (1993). “Better City Government at Half the Price,” in Chicago’s Future in a Time of Change, ed. Richard Simpson. Stipes; Carlson, Tucker (1995). “Safety Inc.: Private Cops Are There When You Need Them,” Policy Review 73 (Summer); Benson, Bruce L. (1990), op. cit.; Morgan, David R. (1992). “The Pitfalls of Privatization: Contracting Without Competition,” American Review of Public Administration 22, no. 4:251–68; and Clemow, Brian (1992). “Privatization and the Public Good,” Labor Law Journal: 344–49.
27. Linowes, David F. (1988). “Report of the President’s Commission on Privatization,” in Privatization: Toward More Effective Government. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office; Wessel, Robert H. (1995), op. cit.; Benson, Bruce L. (1990), op. cit.; and Donahue, John D. (1989), op. cit.
28. Donahue, John D. (1989), op. cit.
29. Carlson, Tucker (1995), op. cit; and Patterson, Julien (1995). “Forging Creative Alliances,” Security Management, January.
30. Benson, Bruce L. (1990), op. cit.
31. Hebdon, R. (1995). “Contracting Out in New York State: The Story the Lauder Report Chose Not to Tell,” Labor Studies Journal 20, no. 1:3–24; Donahue, John D. (1989), op. cit.; and Chanken, Marcia and Jan Chaiken (1987), op. cit.
32. Bilik, Al (1992). “Privatization: Defacing the Community,” Labor Law Journal:338–43; Shenk, Joshua Wolf (1995). “The Perils of Privatization,” The Washington Monthly, May; Schine, Eric, Richard S. Dunham, and Christopher Farrell (1994). “America’s New Watchword: If it Moves, Privatize It,” Business Week, December. 33. Shearing, Clifford D. and Philip C. Stenning (1983), op. cit.
34. Swonk, Diane (2003). The Passionate Economist: Find the Power and Humanity Behind the Numbers. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
35. Pastor, James F. (2003), op. cit.
36. For an explanation of this research and its findings, please see Pastor, James F. (2003). The Privatization of Police in America: An Analysis and Case Study. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
37. See Farnham, Alan (1992). “U.S. Suburbs Are Under Siege,” Fortune, December 28. He reported that in Los Angeles, 35 neighborhoods have asked local governmental permission to separate from the surrounding communities by installing gates and hiring security firms. In suburban Detroit, the 2,300-home East English Village Association hired a private security force to supplement patrols of local police. The reasoning behind this decision is illustrated by a statement from the president of this property association: “We figured if we wanted to keep this neighborhood stable, we couldn’t stick our heads in the sand and say the police should take care of it. We realized there’s only so much they can do.” Also see Cruickshank, Ken (1994). “Frenchman’s Creek Provides the Ultimate in Security,” Manager’s Report 8 (November), who described a property association in the Frenchman’s Creek development in Florida that hired a “mini-swat team” (called S.T.O.P.—Special Tactical and Operations Personnel). This specially trained tactical team “roams the grounds every night dressed in camouflage
face paint to stay as unobtrusive as possible and give them the edge on any intruder.” The author asserts that this “tactical team” stays sharp by conducting exercises with sophisticated equipment, including high-tech night vision gear and infrared body heat detectors that distinguish a human body from the surrounding vegetation. The security force also includes a marine patrol and enforces speed limits by ticketing violators.
38. Blakely, Edward J. and Mary Gail Snyder (1997). “Gating America.” www.asu.edu/
caed/proceedings97/Blakely (retrieved on October 28, 2004).
39. McGoey, Chris E. (1999). “Gated Communities: Access Control Issues.” www.crimedoctor.
com/gated.htm (retrieved on June 20, 2006).
40. Landman, Karina (2003). “National Survey of Gated Communities in South Africa.” www.gatedcomsa.com (retrieved on June 20, 2006).
41. See, for example, Meserve, Jeanne, Eliott McLaughlin, and Kelli Arena (2007), “Malls Debate How to Protect Shoppers From Violence,” CNN, December 6, who note that the killing of eight people at an Omaha, Nebraska, mall has raised security questions at malls across the country. Security officials at the 1,200 malls and 50,000 shopping centers in the United States are expected to consider adding more security measures and updating their emergency plans. Security should watch people as they enter the mall, looking for suspicious behavior that could signal a violent act is about to take place. Focus groups conducted by the International Council of Shopping Centers showed that shoppers would accept additional security measures, such as bag checks and magnetometers, only if the national threat advisory system was raised to level red. Malls are doing more to train their guards after a 2006 study revealed that only a few states require training or minimum hiring standards. The council worked with George Washington University to create a training video that has been seen by an estimated 6,000 security guards over the past year.
42. Davis, Robert C. and Sarah Dadush (2000). “The Public Accountability of Private Police: Lessons from New York, Johannesburg, and Mexico City,” Vera Institute of Justice, August.
43. http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=40050&dcn=e_hsw.
44. Simeone, Matthew J. (2006). “The Power of Public-Private Partnerships P3 Networks in Policing,” The Police Chief May; Cooke, Leonard G. and Lisa R. Hahn (2006). “The Missing Link in Homeland Security,” The Police Chief 73, no. 11 (November); and National Policy Summit: Building Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism and Public Disorder (2004). Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. U.S. Department of Justice.
45. Pastor, James F. (2003), op. cit.
46. U.S. Department of Labor Statistics from May 2004 cited in Security Director’s Report (2006), March: 7. www.ioma.com; IOMA (2001). Security Director’s Report, May.
47. 2006 ASIS Security Industry Salary Survey cited in Security Management August: 20.
48. Reynolds, Morgan O. (1994). “Using the Private Sector to Deter Crime,” NationalCenter for Policy Analysis, March; and Pastor, James F. (2003), op. cit.
49. Miranda, Rowan A. (1993), op. cit.
50. Hans Heitman and Thomas Linnane v. City of Chicago, 04 C 3304, U.S. District Court for Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, order issued on September 11, 2007.
51. Spitzer, Steven and Andrew T. Scull (1977). “Privatization and Capitalist Development: The Case of the Private Police,” Social Problems 25, no. 1:18–28.
52. Savas, E. S. (2000). Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships. New York: Chatham House.
53. Youngs, Al (2004). “The Future of Public/Private Partnerships,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, January.
54. “Private Security Services” from the Freedonia Group, Inc., cited in Security Management (2008), November:22.
55. Uchitelle, Louis and John Markoff (2004). “Terrorbusters, Inc: The Rise of the Homeland Security Industrial Complex,” The New York Times, October 17; and “Aiming to Protect and Serve” (2007). Investor’s Business Daily August 17.
56. A pointed example of this dilemma was discussed by Kelling and Coles where they cite data from Boston. From 1975 to 1991, the total number of 911 calls rose about 33 percent. In 1975, the “non-index” calls were 350,000. By 1991 they rose to 600,000. See Kelling, George L. and Catherine M. Coles (1996), op. cit., 91; Hyde, David (2001), op. cit., 14; and Pastor, James F. (2005), op. cit.
57. Scott, Michael S. and Herman Goldstein (2005). “Shifting and Sharing Responsibilities for Public Safety Problems: Problem Oriented Guides for Police Response,” Guide Series no. 3, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. U.S. Department of Justice (August):1–53.
58. “Call stacking” is a process that the computer system performs where non-emergency, lower priority calls are ranked and held (“stacked”) so that higher priorities are continually dispatched first. For most busy departments, call stacking and delayed response have become the norm. For analysis of this process, see McEwen, Tom, Deborah Spence, Russell Wolff, Julie Wartell, and Barbara Webster (2003). “Call Management and Community Policing: A Guidebook for Law Enforcement.” Institute for Law and Justice. U.S. Department of Justice (February).
59. Carlson, Tucker (1995), op. cit.
60. Youngs, Al (2004), op. cit.
61. Blackstone, Erwin A. and Simon Hakim (2002). “A Market Solution for False Alarms,” Reason, November 11.
62. www.seattle.gov (retrieved on November 22, 2004).
63. Lowrey, Michael (2003). “Incentives, Privatization Help City Police: Charlotte Addresses Burglar Alarm Abuse through Creative Program,” Carolina Journal Online, November 17. www.carolinajournal.com/issues/display_story.html?id=1197 (retrieved on March 7, 2004).
64. This statistic was cited from an editorial in the Los Angeles Times in January 2003 by Betten, Michael and Mitchell Mervosh (2005). “Should Police Respond to Alarms?” www.securitymanagement.com (retrieved on June 8, 2005).
65. Garza, Mariel (2002). “Alarm Plan: Police May Quit Reacting,” L.A. Daily News, December 2. www.freerepublic.com (retrieved on May 13, 2004).
66. Olick, M. (1994). “Private Response: The No Response Solution,” Security News, December; Benson, Bruce L. (1990), op. cit; and Cunningham et al. (1991), op. cit.
67. Litsikas, Mary (1994). “Security System Installations Up in 1994,” Security Distributing and Marketing, September; and Cunningham et al. (1991), op. cit.
68. See Lowrey, Michael (2003), op. cit., 1, for an example of this system.
69. Blackstone, Erwin A. and Simon Hakim (2002), op. cit., 2.
70. Lowrey, Michael (2003), op. cit., 2.
71. Lowrey, Michael (2003), op. cit., 2; and Scott, Michael S. and Herman Goldstein (2005), op. cit., 27–28.
72. Betten, Michael and Mitchell Mervosh (2005), op. cit., 3; and Lowrey, Michael (2003), op. cit., 2.
73. Betten, Michael and Mitchell Mervosh (2005), op. cit., 3; and Lowrey, Michael (2003), op. cit., 2.
74. Davis, Robert C. and Sarah Dadush (2000), op. cit.
75. Pastor, James F. (2003), op. cit.
76. Palango, Paul (1998), op. cit.; and Pastor, James F. (2003), op. cit.
77. Meadows, Robert J. (1991). “Premises Liability and Negligent Security: Issues and Implications.,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 7, no. 3:112–25; Spencer, Suzy (1997). “Private Security.” Phoenix Mosaic Group. onpatrol.com/cs.privsec. html; Benson, Bruce L. (1997). “Privatization in Criminal Justice.” National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. U.S. Department of Justice; Tolchin, Martin (1985), op. cit.; Cunningham, William C., John J. Strauchs and Clifford W. Van Meter (1991), op. cit.; Walinsky, Adam (1993), op. cit.; and McLeod, Ross (2002), op. cit.
78. Litsikas, Mary (1994), op. cit.
79. Smith, Lynn Newhart and Gary D. Hill (1991). “Victimization and Fear of Crime,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 18, no. 2:217–40; Lewis, Dan A. and Michael G. Maxfield (1980). “Fear in the Neighborhoods: An Investigation of the Impact of Crime,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency July:160–89; Liska, Allen E., Joseph J. Lawrence, and Andrew Sanchirico (1982). “Fear of Crime as a Social Fact,” Social Forces 60, no.
3:760–70; Benson, Bruce L. (1990), op. cit.; and Moore, Mark H. and Robert C. Trojanowicz (1988), op. cit.
80. West, Marty L. (1993). “Get a Piece of the Privatization Pie,” Security Management, March; Farnham, Alan (1992), op. cit.; Walinsky, Adam (1993), op. cit.; and Litsikas, Mary (1994), op. cit.
81. Lewis, Dan A. and Michael G. Maxfield (1980), op. cit.
82. Hawley, Chris (2007). “Security Business Booms in Mexico,” ArizonaRepublic, May 3.
83. Avila, Oscar (2008). “Mexico City’s Crime Rate Is Like Gold for Security Firms,” Chicago Tribune, May 20.
84. Bellman, Eric (2008). “A Traumatized Mumbai Seeks to Protect Itself,” Wall Street Journal, December 18.
85. Davis, Robert C. and Sarah Dadush (2000), op. cit.; and Felson, Marcus (2002), op. cit., 111 and 114.
86. Lyall, Sarah (2007). “Britain Plans New Security Measures,” New York Times, November 15.
87. Bagli, Charles V. (2008). “Police Want Tight Security Zone at Ground Zero,” New York Times, August 12.
88. http://www.dailynews.com/news/ci_8527308 (retrieved on March 17, 2008).
89. McEwen, Tom, Deborah Spence, Russell Wolff, Julie Wartell, and Barbara Webster (2003), op. cit., 38–39; and Youngs, Al (2004), op. cit.
90. Andrews International, Inc. (2007). “A Private Police Success Story,” Andrews International, Inc. March: 1.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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