Liability and Operational Implications of Off-Duty Police Employment - p2

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Governmental Immunity and Liability

Whatever test is applied, either public function or scope of employment, the next inquiry is to assess whether governmental immunity applies. If the action did not involve a public function or if the employer was deemed to be the private firm, no immunity would apply since immunity is only afforded to government. Generally, immunity is an affirmative defense available to policing agencies. It is widely acknowledged that police officers must exercise discretion in enforcing laws and protecting public safety. For that reason, a municipality often enjoys immunity for actions police officers take or fail to take in performing discretionary activities inherent in policing. It is available if the underlying action was not a breach of a clearly established right and the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.₂₀ For example, municipalities may be liable when officers act outside the realm of acceptable police practice and not subject to discretion or when they engage in willful and wanton conduct, in bad faith, or with malice. Whether qualified immunity applies is a question of law for the court to consider.₂₁

In summary, as you consider the liability exposure from off-duty police employment, the key factors are the nature and the scope of the work involved and the relationship between the parties. It may be useful to survey a few cases to illustrate this point. These are actual court decisions, which were heavily edited in an effort to illustrate the principles mentioned above and provide context to the suggested guidelines to be discussed at the end of this article.

Case Summaries

In Turk v. Iowa West Racing Association,₂₂ an incident took place at the casino operated by Iowa West Racing Association, Inc. (Bluffs Run). The Turks were walking through the casino; carrying glasses of alcohol; laughing; and on occasion, staggering and stumbling. The couple was stopped by Bluffs Run security supervisor Diana Rodriguez, accompanied by uniformed security guards. The Turks were stopped because Jacqueline Turk appeared to be intoxicated.

Jacqueline was informed that she could either leave the casino or submit to a preliminary breath screening test (PBT). This was in accord with standard casino policy and with a state statute, which prohibits casinos from allowing visibly intoxicated persons to gamble. Jacqueline refused to leave the casino or submit to a PBT. Within a few moments, Rodriguez and the guards were joined by security manager Don Coniglio, who requested the assistance of uniformed off-duty police officers. Officers Galvin and Sellers were working at the casino pursuant to a contract between Bluffs Run and the City of Council Bluffs. Officers Galvin and Sellers briefly interacted with and observed the Turks.

This interaction led to Robert Turk being taken down to the floor by Officer Galvin and Officer Sellers. During the course of subduing and handcuffing Robert, who can be seen on a video struggling despite the efforts of the officers and casino security guards, Officer Sellers gave one clear, and perhaps a second less forceful, knee strike in the general area of Robert’s upper buttocks. Jacqueline tried to intervene and was also handcuffed. Both Robert and Jacqueline were charged with offenses stemming from the incident. Jacqueline entered guilty pleas to her charges. Robert was found guilty of interference with official acts and assaulting a peace officer, and these convictions were upheld by the court.

The Turks subsequently filed suit against Bluffs Run, the City, and Officers Galvin and Sellers. The court determined that the claims against Bluffs Run failed as a matter of law and that the officers as well as the City had qualified immunity for any actions of the officers. The Turks appealed.

The Turks contended that the officers demanded that they submit to PBT tests even though they did not have probable cause to believe they were intoxicated and that Officer Sellers assaulted Jacqueline and Robert by pushing him, laying both hands on him, and throwing him to the floor. In addition, they alleged unreasonable force was used by Officers Sellers and Galvin in throwing Robert to the floor and by Officer Sellers in delivering the knee strike(s). In regard to all three counts, the district court ruled that Officers Sellers and Galvin were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The court found that a reasonable officer would >suspect that the plaintiffs were intoxicated and that the officers acted reasonably in detaining the Turks. The court further found the City immune. In regard to the civil rights violations, the officers were shielded from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The relevant question is whether a reasonable officer “could have believed” the officers’ actions were lawful, “in light of clearly established law and the information [Sellers and Galvin] possessed.”

We conclude that Officer Sellers acted in an objectively reasonable manner when he took Jacqueline’s drink and pushed or moved back Robert with his arm and when both Officer Sellers and Galvin took Robert down to the floor. The officers were faced with two uncooperative individuals, one who became physically aggressive with Officer Sellers. The officers responded by taking Robert to the floor and handcuffing him. Under the circumstances, a reasonable officer could conclude that, as the situation escalated, the steps the officers took were reasonably necessary to control the situation and ensure their own safety.

Finally, as to the allegations of unreasonable force, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take Robert down to the floor and restrain him. The videotape reveals that the knee strike(s) were used by Officer Sellers in an attempt to subdue and handcuff Robert, who was continuing to struggle and resist the efforts of both officers and casino personal. The strikes were also objectively reasonable, so long as that amount of force was reasonably necessary to subdue and handcuff Robert, who was being arrested for assaulting Officer Sellers. Under the circumstances, the knee strike(s) aimed in the general area of the upper buttocks was objectively reasonable. We conclude that Officers Sellers and Galvin did act in an objectively reasonable manner in fulfilling their duties. Thus, the City is also immune. The >court then affirmed the summary judgment of the Turk’s claims.

In another off-duty police case, Martin v. Hughes,₂₃ Robert Hughes, and his wife, Lori Hughes, arrived at Graham Central Station (GCS), a bar and dance club. Martin, an off-duty police officer from the Tatum, Texas, Police Department was working as a security guard at GCS. Martin ejected Robert from the club after an altercation with another patron. While each party gives different versions of the events that occurred in the parking lot, it is undisputed that after the incident, the Longview Police Department (LPD) arrived at the scene. The LPD did not arrest Robert Hughes after the incident.

Robert and Lori Hughes later sued Martin and GCS for personal injury damages, alleging that Martin was negligent in his use of unnecessary and excessive force and that GCS was negligent for hiring Martin. Martin and GCS filed motions asking the trial court to dismiss the case. They argued that as a police officer discharging his duty, Martin was entitled to official immunity from being sued. The trial court denied the motions. Martin and GCS appealed.

The elements of the defense of official immunity are the performance of a discretionary function, within the scope of the employee’s authority, and while performing that function in good faith. In order to establish good faith as a matte of law, Martin was required to show that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that his conduct was justified based on the information he possessed when the conduct occurred. The principal element of the official immunity defense at issue is whether Martin acted in good faith. The record reflects numerous conflicting versions of the incident between Robert and Martin. Even the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission report compiled after an investigation of the incident notes that “all accounts are different depending on which party [the investigator] spoke to.” Texas jurisprudence mandates that a movant on summary judgment fails to conclusively establish good faith when the material facts relied on to support good faith are in dispute. We, therefore, leave to the fact finder the determination of whether Robert’s or Martin’s version of the facts is the correct one. Because the material facts relied on to support good faith are in dispute, Martin has not conclusively proven his good faith, specifically, that a reasonably prudent officer, under similar circumstances, might have taken the same action he took after Robert dropped the pipe in the parking lot of GCS. Consequently, Martin and GCS failed to conclusively establish that Martin acted in good faith; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying his motion for summary judgment on official immunity grounds. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

In another off-duty police case, Lovelace v. Anderson,₂₄ a hotel guest brought a personal injury action against an off-duty police officer, owners of hotel, the city, and city police department, seeking recovery for a wound that guest suffered when struck by a bullet, which the officer fired during a gun battle with two armed robbers in the hotel lobby during the officer’s shift as a security guard. In this case, an off-duty Baltimore City police officer, Kenneth Anderson, was employed by a hotel as a private security guard. While Anderson was on duty, two men entered the hotel lobby and pointed a sawed-off shotgun at the desk clerk, attempting a robbery. Anderson, who was in the hotel lobby at the time, took out his police service handgun, and a gun battle ensued between Anderson and the robbers. The plaintiff, James Lovelace, a guest of the hotel who happened to be in the lobby at the time, was struck and injured by a bullet fired from Anderson’s handgun.

Kenneth Anderson was employed by the Baltimore City Police Department, working 40 hours per week as an administrative sergeant. Anderson’s duties for the Baltimore City Police Department at that time consisted of “administrative stuff that came >across my desk, with reference to photographs, vehicles, vehicle maintenance . . . medical.” He did not, at the time, work the streets for the police department. During his off-duty hours, Anderson was employed as a security guard at a hotel outside of Baltimore City. According to Anderson’s deposition testimony, he worked 24 or 25 >hours per week for the Days Inn. Anderson further testified that, at the time he and >other security guards were hired by the hotel, the person who hired them “wanted us to work security. She had special assignments for us, and one of them was to prevent robberies if we could . . .” When on duty as a security guard, Anderson would not wear his police uniform but would dress in “just regular everyday plain clothes.” Anderson further testified that when on duty as security, the management “did not want our guns to show.” Anderson’s police service handgun was a Glock 17 nine millimeter semi-automatic pistol, which, when fully loaded, would hold 17 bullets. He carried this handgun, concealed, when acting as a security guard for the hotel. Anderson had not obtained a permit to carry a handgun when employed as a >security guard from the Maryland State Police.

In December 1993, two individuals, later identified as Earl Jennings and Randy Terry, entered the hotel lobby and walked to the front desk. Terry removed a sawed-off shotgun from under his coat, pointed it at the front desk clerk, Michael Gordon, and yelled “hold up.” Jennings immediately took out a bag and handed it to Gordon. When Terry pointed the shotgun at Gordon, Anderson stood up, unzipped his jacket, got out his pistol, and announced “police.” According to Anderson, Terry turned around and fired at Anderson. Anderson stated that he returned the fire, that he was shooting with “tunnel vision,” that the “only thing I could see was that shotgun and the two suspects,” and that he “lost sight of Mr. Lovelace.” Anderson discharged 12 rounds of ammunition in “about three seconds.”

Jennings was killed by a shot to his head. Terry was shot in the back, but he was able to flee. Terry was later apprehended, convicted of attempted robbery and attempted murder, and sentenced to 32 years in prison. Anderson lost three fingers from his left hand as a result of the gun battle. Anderson did not know that Lovelace had been shot until sometime after the gun battle. A ballistics expert, who had worked 15 years for the Maryland State Police Crime Laboratory, stated that the bullet recovered from Lovelace’s body was fired from Anderson’s Glock 17 nine millimeter pistol.

Certain regulations of the Baltimore City Police Department, as well as state statutory provisions, are relevant in this case. These are: secondary employment of police officers, authority of police officers outside of their territorial jurisdiction, and immunities of police officers. For example, the Baltimore City Police Department’s general orders specifically regulate secondary employment by police officers, including obtaining the department’s permission to engage in secondary employment and to limit allowable secondary employment to that specified in the permission. The same general order requires a police officer engaging in secondary employment to “obtain a handgun permit from the Maryland State Police, when you are required by your secondary employers to be armed as a condition of your employment. In this case, you are armed under the authority of your secondary employer.”

• The same general order relates to secondary employment outside of Baltimore City, which, among other factors, requires the off-duty police officer to . . .
• Act as a private citizen, without exercising powers and duties of a police officer.
• Not use Baltimore City Police credentials or equipment.

Anderson had received permission from the Baltimore City Police Department to work as a security guard at the Days Inn. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, Anderson had not obtained a permit from the Maryland State Police to carry a handgun while engaged in his secondary employment. In an affidavit filed by Colonel Wilbert T. Travers, Jr., a former superintendent of the Maryland State Police, he expressed the opinion that Anderson’s secondary employment was in violation of Baltimore City Police Department regulations concerning secondary employment, that he was not acting as a Baltimore City Police Officer during the gun battle, and that he was guilty of gross negligence.

The plaintiffs argue that, for several reasons, neither Anderson nor the hotel owners and operators were entitled to any form of immunity. The plaintiffs claim that Anderson was not acting as a police officer during the evening of December 2, 1993; that Anderson was acting in the scope of his employment as a security guard for the hotel; and that he was, during the attempted robbery and gun battle, doing precisely what he was hired to do and paid to do for the hotel. A principal thrust of the plaintiffs’ argument is that Anderson was acting exclusively for the hotel owners and operators during the incident. Alternatively, the plaintiffs assert that Anderson was acting within the scope of his employment for both the hotel and the police department during the incident, and that, therefore, a jury could properly find that both the hotel and the city were liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

While acting as a private security guard for the hotel, Anderson was clearly not entitled to public official immunity. One is entitled to public official immunity only when he is acting as a public official rather than in some other capacity and only when “his conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in furtherance of his official duties.” In addition, privately employed security guards are not entitled to immunity when their negligence in attempting to prevent crimes or apprehend criminals is a proximate cause of injury to innocent third persons. A person, including an off-duty public official, who negligently injures someone while acting in the scope of his or her employment for a private employer, is not entitled to public official immunity.

The trial court’s holding overlooked the settled principle of Maryland law that “[a] worker may simultaneously be the employee of two employers.” This court has frequently discussed the various factors or criteria for determining whether an employer-employee relationship existed at a particular time and whether the employee’s actions were within the scope of that employment relationship. As to whether a particular action is within the scope of the employment relationship, numerous considerations are relevant: whether the action was in furtherance of the employer’s business or was personal to the employee, whether it occurred during the period when the employee was on duty for the employer, whether it related to the employee’s duties, whether the action was in a broad sense authorized by the employer, whether the employer had reason to expect that the type of action might occur, and whether it occurred in an authorized locality.

Turning to the present case, the evidence was more than sufficient to show an employment relationship between Anderson and the hotel during the attempted robbery and that Anderson was acting within the scope of that employment relationship, even assuming arguendo that he was also acting as a Baltimore City police officer. Anderson was hired as a security guard by the hotel, and he was paid by the hotel for the entire period of time in question. He was on duty as ahotel employee at the time of the incident. The hotel had the authority to discharge him as a hotel security guard.

The evidence also shows that providing security for the hotel and its guests was part of the hotel’s business. Anderson himself testified that, when he was hired, he was told that one of his duties for the hotel was to prevent robberies, if he could. In addition, under Maryland common law, an innkeeper owes a duty of providing security for the innkeeper’s guests and their baggage and is liable if that duty is breached by the negligence of the innkeeper or the innkeeper’s employees. Furthermore, Anderson’s testimony concerning the duties for which he was hired by the hotel, the manner of dress, the hotel management’s direction that security guards’ handguns be concealed, and the assignments given to Anderson and other security guards showed the type of control that is typical of an employer-employee relationship. Anderson testified that the hotel management person who hired and supervised the security guards “wanted us to work security assignments, such as to prevent robberies, and police the lot to prevent vehicle thefts, thefts from the vehicles, and wanted us to check on rooms because people would more or less get done with the room and pass the key on to a friend.”

The hotel management may not have exercised control over all of the details of how a security guard would attempt to stop a robbery in progress, regardless of whether the security guard was an off-duty police officer or was a trained security guard who was not connected with a police department. Nevertheless, such control is not a prerequisite for an employer-employee relationship.

The evidence demonstrated that, during the attempted robbery, Anderson was employed by the hotel as a security guard and was acting within the scope of that employment. In preventing the completion of an armed robbery, Anderson was performing one of the specific duties for which he had been hired by the hotel management.

In other jurisdictions that apply normal principles of agency law under circumstances similar to those in the present case, courts regularly hold that the off-duty police officers and their private employers are liable for injuries resulting from the police officer’s conduct in the scope of secondary private employment. For example, in [citation omitted], the plaintiff, while shopping at the defendant’s department store, was arrested for alleged shoplifting by an off-duty police officer employed by the store as a security guard. In affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the store, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated₂₅. . . In essence the appellant contends that . . . an employer, by engaging an off-duty policeman as its agent, can immunize itself from liability for an unlawful arrest whenever the officer acts upon his own initiative. That contention, however, runs counter to the basic rule that a principal is liable for its agent’s torts when committed in the course of his employment and for the principal’s benefit.

Moreover, there is little rational basis for exempting off-duty police officers employed as security guards and their private employers from liability for the wrongful acts of the security guards but not exempting former police officers, retired police officers, trained security guards, and their employers from liability. Several cases applying traditional agency principles have made this precise point.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee in [citation omitted] pointed out that cases applying special rules and refusing to apply traditional agency principles to the private secondary employment of off-duty police officers, have “resulted in over insulating private employers who would otherwise be subject to liability if the security guard were not also employed by a municipal police department.” The court continued “moreover, eliminating vicarious liability for private employers who hire off-duty police officers encourages such employers to shift their risk of liability to the municipality solely because their employees are also employees of the local police department.” The Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded . . the private employer may take advantage of the benefits of hiring an off-duty officer without assuming any of the normal risks of liability associated with hiring non-officer employees. We simply do not believe that in many cases, the risk of loss is properly shifted from the private employer to the municipality or to an innocent plaintiff, and we therefore disagree with the public policy rationales advanced by many of our sister jurisdictions . . . on this issue.

In conclusion, numerous cases apply ordinary agency law principles to the employment of off-duty police officers by private businesses. This position, we believe, is most consistent with the prior holdings of this Court. In light of settled principles of Maryland agency law, the motions for summary judgment by Anderson and the hotel should have been denied.

In another off-duty police case, White v. Revco Discount Drug Centers,₂₆ the issue of whether private employers may be held vicariously liable for the torts committed by an off-duty police officer employed as a private security guard. In the typical case involving the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for the torts committed by his or her employees while performing duties within the scope of employment. Although a private employer is certainly “not immune from liability for the negligent or wanton acts of an employee for the reason that the employee has official status as a police officer,” we recognize that issues stemming from the private employment of off-duty officers do not fit precisely within the typical framework of respondeat superior. This incongruity arises largely because the special status of peace officers in this state permits an off-duty officer to act within the scope of his or her public employment, even while otherwise performing duties for the private employer.

Other jurisdictions that have examined this issue are divided as to whether, and under what circumstances, a private employer may be held liable for the actions of an off-duty officer employed as a security guard. Irrespective of the ultimate conclusion reached, though, most jurisdictions, if not all, resolve this type of issue by looking to the “nature” of the act committed by the off-duty officer. A majority of jurisdictions find that because the officer’s actions giving rise to the tort were taken in the officer’s official capacity, the private employer cannot be held vicariously liable.

While various rationales are used to reach this conclusion, most jurisdictions reason that the officer’s actions were “official” because police officers have an ever-present public duty to preserve the peace and enforce the law or the officer’s action was taken to vindicate a public right or to benefit the public in general. In addition to these considerations, some courts have even declined to impose vicarious liability on employers based, in part, on public policy grounds, holding that employment of police officers as security guards is a deterrence of crime. Consequently, even though jurisdictions may disagree as to the proper resolution of any given case, virtually all jurisdictions ultimately follow a nature-of-the-act (public function) approach in determining private employer liability for the actions of an off-duty officer employed as a security guard.

Upon due consideration, we decline to strictly analyze this issue according to the nature of the officer’s actions (the public function test), as this approach does not closely comport with existing Tennessee law. When analyzed in terms of current Tennessee law and practice, the nature-of-the-act analysis has three primary shortcomings. First, this type of analysis fails to take into account the fact that many of the actions taken by officers to “vindicate public rights” may also be lawfully taken by private citizens to serve other interests. For example, police officers in Tennessee do not possess the exclusive authority to make arrests, as private citizens possess this power in many of the same circumstances as officers on official duty. In addition, private citizens employed as security guards in Tennessee are authorized by statute to undertake many actions for private interests that also appear to be consistent with a general vindication of public rights. For example, private security guards in this state are authorized to protect persons and/or property from criminal activities, including, but not limited to the following:

• Prevention and/or detection of intrusion, unauthorized entry, larceny, vandalism, abuse, fire or trespass on private property
• Prevention, observation, or detection of any unauthorized activity on private property
• Enforcement of rules, regulations, or local or state laws on private property
• Control, regulation, or direction of the flow or movements of the public, whether by vehicle or otherwise on private property
• Street patrol service

As the state statute makes clear, private security guards are authorized to enforc local and state laws and to protect persons and property against general criminal activities, irrespective of whether the guard is a private citizen or an off-duty officer. Because many of these statutorily authorized activities could legitimately be viewed either as serving the interests of the private employer or as vindicating public rights, analysis focusing on the “nature” of the act may not provide a meaningful basis upon which to impose vicarious liability on the private employer.

Secondly, an approach that looks to the private nature of the officer’s actions ignores the fact that police officers in Tennessee still possess the full panoply of “official” police power, even when they are off duty. Indeed, this benefit is one of the considerable advantages of employing off-duty officers as private security guards, and we are unwilling to restrict the powers of an off-duty officer solely to accommodate a test that examines the nature of the acts committed. For the same reasons that we reject a test denying vicarious liability when the off-duty officer performs “official actions,” we must necessarily reject a rule that holds private employers liable in situations solely because the acts committed by the off-duty officer were “private” in nature.

Lastly, while most states decline to impose vicarious liability on private employers because police officers have a continuous duty to keep the peace and enforce the law, we can find no corresponding statute or rule of law in this state that places a mandatory duty upon police officers to keep the peace when “off duty.” To the contrary, when officers are “off duty,” our statutes generally treat the officer as an ordinary private citizen and not as an agent or employee of the municipal police department under a general duty to keep the peace. Consequently, to the extent that a nature-of-the-act analysis focuses upon some continuous duty of police officers to keep the peace, that analysis is impractical in this state.

Of course, to say that officers do not continuously function in an official capacity is not to say that off-duty officers are prevented from assuming a duty to remedy a breach of the peace or that officers are incapable of being summoned to official duty by the municipality. Nevertheless, it is clear that officers are not under a general duty to enforce the law while “off duty,” and a blanket rule declaring that police officers are under a never-ending duty to keep the peace is contrary to existing Tennessee law. We, therefore, decline to use this rationale in determining the scope of private employer liability.

For these reasons, we conclude that a test examining the nature of the officer’s actions to resolve the question of employer liability is probably unworkable within the current framework. No doubt because of the practical difficulty in determining the proper nature of the actions committed by a security guard, this test has resulted in over-insulating private employers who would otherwise be subject to liability if the security guard were not also employed by a municipal police department. While a few states in minority jurisdictions have held employers liable under this approach, the vast majority of jurisdictions using this approach have held that private employers are not liable. We are unwilling to provide such practical immunity for private employers based only upon negligible distinctions concerning the “nature” of the officer’s conduct.

Several jurisdictions have also used public policy considerations to hold that private employers are not liable for the actions of off-duty officers employed as security guards. These jurisdictions generally reason that because deterrence of crime is furthered by employing police officers, private employers should be encouraged to hire such officers as security guards. In its most basic sense, therefore, these jurisdictions have decided to grant practical immunity to private employers in exchange for the perceived benefit derived from private employers hiring off-duty officers as security guards.

Although we agree that deterrence of crime may be rationally furthered by the hiring of off-duty officers, we also recognize that some level of deterrence isprovided simply by hiring private security guards, irrespective of whether theguards are off-duty officers or private citizens. Moreover, eliminating vicarious liability for private employers who hire off-duty police officers encourages such employers to shift their risk of liability to the municipality solely because their employees are also employees of the local police department. As jurisdictions following a nature-of-the-act approach recognize, at least implicitly, the private employer would have been vicariously liable for the torts of its security guard except for the fact that the security guard is also a municipal police officer. As such, allowing liability based only upon the official status of the employee undermines the modern rationale of vicarious liability and is the result of “deliberate allocation of risk.”

After due consideration, we conclude that issues of employer liability for the acts of off-duty police officers are best resolved under traditional principles of agency law. Use of agency principles to resolve this complex issue has several advantages.

To summarize agency principles in terms of application to the issue in this case, we conclude that private employers may be held vicariously liable for the acts of an off-duty police officer employed as a private security guard under any of the following circumstances:

• The action taken by the off-duty officer occurred within the scope of private employment.
• The action taken by the off-duty officer occurred outside of the regular scope of employment, if the action giving rise to the tort was taken in obedience to orders or directions of the employer and the harm proximately resulted from the order or direction.
• The action was taken by the officer with the consent or ratification of the private employer and with an intent to benefit the private employer.

Consistent with agency law, the private employer of an off-duty officer cannot generally be held vicariously liable for actions taken by the off-duty officer outside of the officer’s regular scope of employment as a security guard. As such, when the officer is summoned to official duty by the municipality, or otherwise performs traditional police actions outside of the scope of his or her private employment, the private employer will not be generally liable. The private employer would be liable, however, for acts taken outside of the regular scope of private employment under the following two scenarios: the employer ordered or directed the action or the employer gave consent to the action, which was taken by the officer with a primary intent to benefit the employer. We also recognize that the municipality may also be vicariously liable—along with the private employer—for the actions taken by one of its off-duty police officers.

In yet another off-duty police case, Melendez v. City of Los Angeles,₂₇ a restaurant patron was shot in the back by the non-uniformed, off-duty police officers employed as security guards at the restaurant where shooting occurred. The plaintiff, Adan Melendez, was shot while attempting to obtain a refund for a ticket he had bought at an “underground” party that was broken up by police. He was one of many seeking refunds at the location where tickets to the concert had been sold. He was kicked by a security guard and then shot by another guard. His injuries are permanent and severe. Because the security guards were off-duty officers of the Los Angeles Police Department, an agency of the City of Los Angeles, he sued the restaurant owner and operator, the underground party organizer, Officers Burris and Oskierko, and the City of Los Angeles. The plaintiff’s lawsuits were successful, and he obtained substantial dollar judgments. The appellate court reversed the judgment against the City.

The incident occurred at the Gala Restaurant. A table was set up at an entrance to the restaurant, facing a parking area. Customers approached the table to buy tickets. Two young women sold the tickets. Two persons were hired as security guards for the occasion. Their function was to protect the money collected. The guards were Thomas Burris and Stephen Oskierko. Each was a full-time officer of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and each was working this event while off-duty. They were either employed directly by the event organizer or by Lawman Security. Instead of an LAPD uniform, each wore casual clothes and a blue nylon jacket on which the word “Security” was printed in large white letters, front and back. Neither had the permission of the City to work on this occasion as security guards. Each was armed with an LAPD-approved pistol, and each had his official badge attached to his belt. Respondents presented three theories of liability against the City: (1) respondeat superior, based on the tortious acts of Burris and Oskierko, (2) “direct” liability for failure of the City to adequately supervise these employees, and (3) a federal civil rights act claim (USC, Section 1983).

It has been, and remains, the rule that peace officers such as sworn personnel of the LAPD retain peace officer status and authority, both during and beyond regular duty hours; however, some caveats of this general rule are relevant. First, if a police officer is to work as a private security guard for a private employer, members of the public must have the full notice provided by the uniform that the person is acting as a peace officer. They are thus effectively warned to govern their activity accordingly. The principal employer has full control: it may allow its officers to work part time, or not, according to its policy. It may, for example, allow some to do so while declining permission to others who have a doubtful record in connection with excessive force. The exceptions prove the rule. Peace officers who work as private security guards pursuant to the conditions laid out in the statute have the authority and protection given to peace officers in their usual, public work. Otherwise, they do not.

As we have pointed out, neither Burris nor Oskierko was in uniform when Melendez was shot; neither had permission to do the off-duty work; and neither was authorized to work this unapproved assignment. Whatever these officers may have thought at the time, it follows that neither was acting as a peace officer when Melendez was shot. Since the officers were acting without official authority, there can be no respondeat superior basis for City liability.

The same circumstance defeats the respondents’ second basis of liability: that the City failed to adequately supervise Burris and Oskierko. Respondents focus on citizen complaints against Burris and on expert opinion testimony that the department was not sufficiently sensitive to complaints of excessive force. The City argues that the complaints in hand were not sufficient to alert it to any dangerous propensity by either officer. We need not and do not decide that issue. As we have discussed, each officer was acting on his own without City approval. The law enforcement agency has the authority to allow or not allow a particular officer to work a particular private security guard assignment. If a city in the situation of the City in this case could be held liable, the protection of the statute would be entirely removed and its condition meaningless.

Respondents’ final theory of liability against the City is that Burris and Oskierko violated their civil rights (Section 1983). Respondents count on evidence that Burris and Oskierko used excessive force in the encounter and that there is a pattern of such problems when the law enforcement agency fails to deal properly with problems of excessive force, as the LAPD did in this case.

Not every act by a government agent, violating a federal right, triggers liability. The government may not be held liable solely because it employs an errant officer; “[i]nstead, it is when execution of a government policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under Section 1983.”

The injury suffered by respondents did not flow from any policy or custom. Nor was there a state actor whose actions triggered the statute. Neither Burris nor Oskierko was acting as a peace officer or in any other public capacity in connection with the events at the Gala Restaurant. Nor are any City employees responsible, since none approved of Burris’ or Oskierko’s employment at the restaurant, much less of their use of force.

There is, in sum, no basis to hold the City liable under Section 1983 or under any other theory respondents have presented.

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